Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Sanskrit)

CHAPTER ONE: Conditions / Pratyaya

1.1 na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana // MMK_1.1 //

No existents whatsoever are found anywhere that are arisen from themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause.

[Effect exists within the cause in potentia. Sprout exists within the seed.] [Cause and effect are different. The seed causes the sprout.] [Sprouts exist in potentia in seeds and the seed causes the spout] [Sprouts arise for no reason]

1.2 catvāraḥ pratyayā hetur ārambaṇam anantaram / tathaivādhipateyaṃ ca pratyayo nāsti pañcamaḥ // MMK_1.2 //

There are only four conditions (pratyaya), namely: primary condition (hetu), objectively supporting condition (ālambana), immediately contiguous conditions (samanantara), and dominant condition (adhipati). A fifth condition does not exist.

[hetu = direct cause] [ālambana = object upon which knowledge of causation depends] [samanantara = immediately preceding causes] [adhipati = contributing causes]

1.3 na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu vidyate / avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate // MMK_1.3 //

The self-nature (svabhāva) of existents (bhāva) is not found within conditions. In the absence of self-nature, other-nature (parabhāva) too is not found.

1.4 kriyā na pratyayavatī nāpratyayavatī kriyā / pratyayā nākriyāvantaḥ kriyāvantaś ca santy uta // MMK_1.4 //

Activity (kriyā) is not constituted of conditions nor is it not non-constituted of conditions. Conditions are neither constituted nor non-constituted of activity.

1.5 utpadyate pratītyemān itīme pratyayāḥ kila / yāvan notpadyata ime tāvan nāpratyayāḥ katham // MMK_1.5 //

‘These are conditions, because depending upon them these [others] arise,’ it is said. So long as these [others] do not arise, why are they not [the same as] non-conditions?

1.6 naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate / asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim // MMK_1.6 //

A condition of either a non-existent [result] or existent [result] is not pertinent. [What is] a condition of a non-existent? Of what use is a condition of something that already exists?

1.7 na san nāsan na sad asan dharmo nirvartate yadā / kathaṃ nirvartako hetur evaṃ sati hi yujyate // MMK_1.7 //

Since a thing that is existent or non-existent, or both existent and nonexistent is not produced, How pertinent in that context would a producing cause (hetu) be?

1.8 anārambaṇa evāyaṃ san dharma upadiśyate / athānārambaṇe dharme kuta ārambaṇaṃ punaḥ // MMK_1.8 //

A thing that exists is indicated without objective support (ālambana). When a thing is without objective support, for what purpose is a [further] objective support?

1.9 anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodho nopapadyate / nānantaram ato yuktaṃ niruddhe pratyayaś ca kaḥ // MMK_1.9 //

When things are not arisen (anutpāda), cessation is not appropriate. When [a thing has] ceased, What is [it that serves as] a condition? Therefore, a immediate conditions (samanantara) are not proper.

1.10 bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvānāṃ na sattā vidyate yataḥ / satīdam asmin bhavatīty etan naivopapadyate // MMK_1.10 //

If the existence of existents devoid of self-nature was not found, The statement: "When that exists, this comes to be," would not be appropriate.

[In defining dependent origination, the Buddha always says, “When this exists, there is that.”]

1.11 na ca vyastasamasteṣu pratyayeṣvasti tat phalam / pratyayebhyaḥ kathaṃ tac ca bhaven na pratyayeṣu yat // MMK_1.11 //

The result (phala, ‘fruit’) does not exist in conditions, separated or combined. Therefore, how can that which is not found in the conditions come to be from conditions?

[”A rejection of the essentialist method of looking for effects even before something comes to be.”]

1.12 athāsad api tat tebhyaḥ pratyayebhyaḥ pravartate / apratyayebhyo 'pi kasmān nābhipravartate phalam // MMK_1.12 //

If that result, being non-existent [in the conditions] were to proceed from the conditions, Why does it not proceed from non-conditions?

[”Why don’t things just spring out of nowhere?”]

1.13 phalaṃ ca pratyayamayaṃ pratyayāścāsvayaṃmayāḥ / phalamasvamayebhyo yattatpratyayamayaṃ katham // MMK_1.13 //

The result is made of conditions, but the conditions are themselves not self-made. How can a result made of conditions [arise] from what is not self-made?

1.14 tasmān na pratyayamayaṃ nāpratyayamayaṃ phalam / saṃvidyate phalābhāvāt pratyayāpratyayāḥ kutaḥ // MMK_1.14 //

A result made either of conditions or of non-conditions is, therefore, not found. Because of the absence of the result, where could conditions or non-conditions be found?

CHAPTER TWO: Gone and Not Gone / Gatāgata

2.1 gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva gamyate / gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate // MMK_2.1 //

What has gone is not going. What has not yet gone is also not going. Apart from what has gone and what has not yet gone, the presently going (gamyamāna) is not going.

2.2 ceṣṭā yatra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sā yataḥ / na gate nāgate ceṣṭā gamyamāne gatis tataḥ // MMK_2.2 //

Where there is motion, there is going. Herein lies the presently going, neither in the gone nor the not yet gone, and motion is available in the presently going.

2.3 gamyamānasya gamanaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapatsyate / gamyamānaṃ vigamanaṃ yadā naivopapadyate // MMK_2.3 //

Would it be appropriate to speak of the going of something that goes? For, the non-going of something that goes is certainly not appropriate.

[Is ‘movement’ an independent phenomena?]

2.4 gamyamānasya gamanaṃ yasya tasya prasajyate / ṛte gater gamyamānaṃ gamyamānaṃ hi gamyate // MMK_2.4 //

For one who asserts the going of something presently going, it follows that there could be something presently going without that going. [However,] something that goes, indeed, means being presently going.

[Here Nagarjuna is setting up a distinction between that which goes and ‘the going itself,’ which he explains in the next verse.]

2.5 gamyamānasya gamane prasaktaṃ gamanadvayam / yena tad gamyamānaṃ ca yac cātra gamanaṃ punaḥ // MMK_2.5 //

A two-fold going is implied in the going of something that goes: That by which it is understood that something goes and, again, the going itself.

2.6 dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye / gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanaṃ nopapadyate // MMK_2.6 //

If two goings are allowed, it would follow that there would be two ‘goers’. For, separated from something going, to speak of going is not appropriate.

[i.e. the going of what? Movement does not exist in a vacuum, but only in relation to something else that is not moving.]

2.7 gantāraṃ cet tiraskṛtya gamanaṃ nopapadyate / gamane 'sati gantātha kuta eva bhaviṣyati // MMK_2.7 //

If it is thought that a going separated from something that goes is not appropriate, then, when no going exists, how could there be something going?

[If it doesn’t make sense to talk about movement apart from something moving, then there is no actual ‘movement,’ and if there’s no inherent movement, how could there be something moving?]

2.8 gantā na gacchati tāvad agantā naiva gacchati / anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tṛtīyo 'tha gacchati // MMK_2.8 //

As much as something that goes does not go, something not going too does not go. Other than something going and something not going, what third thing goes?

[And if it is understood that something moving does not actually/inherently have the quality of moving itself, but only relative to something not moving, then it is understood that something stationary is only stationary relative to the very thing deemed moving. And there’s no third.]

2.9 gantā tāvad gacchatīti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate // MMK_2.9 //

Indeed, how appropriate is the view that something that goes goes? For, something that goes without any going is certainly not appropriate.

2.10 pakṣo gantā gacchatīti yasya tasya prasajyate / gamanena vinā gantā gantur gamanam icchataḥ // MMK_2.10 //

For one who thinks, ‘Something going goes,’ and who looks for the going of something going, it follows that there is a going without something going.

[What is an object without attributes?]

2.11 gamane dve prasajyete gantā yadyuta gacchati / ganteti cājyate yena gantā san yac ca gacchati // MMK_2.11 //

If something that goes were to go, then it follows that there are two movements; one in virtue of which it is spoken of as going, and the other in terms of which something that goes is said to go.

2.12 gate nārabhyate gantuṃ gantuṃ nārabhyate 'gate / nārabhyate gamyamāne gantum ārabhyate kuha // MMK_2.12 //

Going does not begin in what has already gone, nor does it begin in what has not yet gone. And it does not being in the presently going. Wherein is there a beginning of going?

[If there’s this circular definition of what is moving and what is not moving, what ‘causes’ movement?]

2.13 na pūrvaṃ gamanārambhād gamyamānaṃ na vā gatam / yatrārabhyeta gamanam agate gamanaṃ kutaḥ // MMK_2.13 //

Prior to a beginning of going, there is neither the presently going nor the already gone. How could there be a going of the not yet gone?

2.14 gataṃ kiṃ gamyamānaṃ kim agataṃ kiṃ vikalpyate / adṛśyamāna ārambhe gamanasyaiva sarvathā // MMK_2.14 //

When the beginning of the presently going is not being perceived in any way, what is it that is discriminated as the gone, the presently going, or the not yet gone?

2.15 gantā na tiṣṭhati tāvad agantā naiva tiṣṭhati / anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tṛtīyo 'tha tiṣṭhati // MMK_2.15 //

As much as something that goes is not stationary, so is a non-goer not stationary. Other than a goer and a non-goer, what third party is stationary?

2.16 gantā tāvat tiṣṭhatīti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate // MMK_2.16 //

How appropriate would it be [to say]: "A goer, at the moment, is stationary"? For, a goer without going is not appropriate.

2.17 na tiṣṭhati gamyamānān na gatān nāgatād api / gamanaṃ saṃpravṛttiś ca nivṛttiś ca gateḥ samā // MMK_2.17 //

Something does not come to be stationary because it is either moving, or has moved, or has not moved. Moving, starting, and stopping and are all comparable to going.

2.18 yad eva gamanaṃ gantā sa eveti na yujyate / anya eva punar gantā gater iti na yujyate // MMK_2.18 //

The view that going is identical with the goer is not proper. The view that the goer is different from going is also not proper.

[This is the ‘middle way.’]

2.19 yad eva gamanaṃ gantā sa eva hi bhaved yadi / ekībhāvaḥ prasajyeta kartuḥ karmaṇa eva ca // MMK_2.19 //

If going were identical with that which goes, it would follow that there is identity of agent and action.

2.20 anya eva punar gantā gater yadi vikalpyate / gamanaṃ syād ṛte gantur gantā syād gamanād ṛte // MMK_2.20 //

If the discrimination is made that the goer is different from going, Then there would be going without something going, and something going without any going.

2.21 ekībhāvena vā siddhir nānābhāvena vā yayoḥ / na vidyate tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate // MMK_2.21 //

When establishment is not found either through identity or through difference, how is their establishment found at all?

2.22 gatyā yayājyate gantā gatiṃ tāṃ sa na gacchati / yasmān na gatipūrvo 'sti kaścid kiṃcid dhi gacchati // MMK_2.22 //

The going by which a goer is spoken of as going, it does not go by that going. Since a goer does exist prior to going, who or what is it that goes?

2.23 gatyā yayājyate gantā tato 'nyāṃ sa na gacchati / gatī dve nopapadyete yasmād eke tu gantari // MMK_2.23 //

Whatever going in terms of which a goer is spoken of as going, it does not carry out a going by a going completely different from it. A two-fold going is not appropriate, since it is only one thing that goes.

2.24 sadbhūto gamanaṃ gantā triprakāraṃ na gacchati / nāsadbhūto 'pi gamanaṃ triprakāraṃ sa gacchati // MMK_2.24 //

A truly existent goer does not go in the three aspects of going (i.e. in the past, present, or future). Also one who is not [a true goer] does not go in the three aspects of going.

2.25 gamanaṃ sadasadbhūtaḥ triprakāraṃ na gacchati / tasmād gatiś ca gantā ca gantavyaṃ ca na vidyate // MMK_2.25 //

Nor does a both existent and non-existent goer go in any of the three ways. Therefore, neither going, nor the goer, nor a place of going is found.

CHAPTER THREE: The Eye Faculty / Cakṣu-indriya

[Seeing without a seer]

3.1 darśanaṃ śravaṇaṃ ghrāṇaṃ rasanaṃ sparśanaṃ manaḥ / indriyāṇi ṣaḍ eteṣāṃ draṣṭavyādīni gocaraḥ // MMK_3.1 //

Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and mind are the six faculties. Their spheres consist of visible objects, (sounds),etc.

3.2 svam ātmānaṃ darśanaṃ hi tat tam eva na paśyati / na paśyati yad ātmānaṃ kathaṃ drakṣyati tat parān // MMK_3.2 //

Seeing does not see itself, its own form. How can that which does not see itself, see others?

3.3 na paryāpto 'gnidṛṣṭānto darśanasya prasiddhaye / sadarśanaḥ sa pratyukto gamyamānagatāgataiḥ // MMK_3.3 //

The example of fire is not adequate for the establishment of seeing. That [fire] together with seeing are refuted by [a refutation of] the presently going, the gone and the not yet gone.

[Fire burns other things but does not burn itself. Therefore, seeing sees other things but not itself, says the Sarvāstivādans. Nagarjuna is implying that just as the goer and the going are neither the same nor different, the seer and seeing are also neither the same nor different.]

3.4 nāpaśyamānaṃ bhavati yadā kiṃ cana darśanam / darśanaṃ paśyatīty evaṃ katham etat tu yujyate // MMK_3.4 //

When some form of seeing that is not seeing (yet) does not exist, how pertinent is the view that seeing sees?

3.5 paśyati darśanaṃ naiva naiva paśyaty adarśanam / vyākhyāto darśanenaiva draṣṭā cāpy avagamyatām // MMK_3.5 //

Seeing does not see, nor does non-seeing see. One should admit that a seer is explained by seeing itself.

3.6 draṣṭā nāsty atiraskṛtya tiraskṛtya ca darśanam / draṣṭavyaṃ darśanaṃ caiva draṣṭary asati te kutaḥ // MMK_3.6 //

A seer does not exist either separated or not separated from seeing. When a seer does not exist, whence can there be seeing and the object of seeing?

3.7 pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putrasaṃbhavaḥ / cakṣūrūpe pratītyaivamukto vijñānasaṃbhavaḥ // MMK_3.7 //

Just as the birth of a son is said to be dependent upon the mother and the father, so too, the arising of consciousness is said to be dependent upon the eye and visible forms.

3.8 draṣṭavyadarśanābhāvād vijñānādicatuṣṭayam / nāstīty upādānādīni bhaviṣyanti punaḥ katham // MMK_3.8 //

If it is the view that the four [mental] aggregates, beginning with consciousness, do not exist, because of the absence of seeing and the object of seeing, how then can there be grasping (upādāna)?

3.9 vyākhyātaṃ śravaṇaṃ ghrāṇaṃ rasanaṃ sparśanaṃ manaḥ / darśanenaiva jānīyāc chrotṛśrotavyakādi ca // MMK_3.9 //

What has been explained as hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and mind, as well as the hearer, the sound, etc. should be known in the same way as seeing.

CHAPTER FOUR: Aggregates / Skandhas

4.1 rūpakāraṇanirmuktaṃ na rūpam upalabhyate / rūpeṇāpi na nirmuktaṃ dṛśyate rūpakāraṇam // MMK_4.1 //

Form (rūpa), distinct from the cause of form (or ‘maker,’ kāraṇa), is not obtained. Similarly, a cause of form, distinct from form, is also not seen.

4.2 rūpakāraṇanirmukte rūpe rūpaṃ prasajyate / āhetukaṃ na cāsty arthaḥ kaścid āhetukaḥ kva cit // MMK_4.2 //

If form is [considered to be] distinct from the cause of form, it follows that form is without a cause. Nowhere is there any effect (arthaḥ) without a cause.

4.3 rūpeṇa tu vinirmuktaṃ yadi syād rūpakāraṇam / akāryakaṃ kāraṇaṃ syād nāsty akāryaṃ ca kāraṇam // MMK_4.3 //

If there were to be a cause of form distinct from form, there would then be a cause without an effect. There certainly is no ineffective cause.

4.4 rūpe saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate / rūpe 'saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate // MMK_4.4 //

When form exists, a cause of form is not appropriate. When form does not exist, a cause of form is also not appropriate.

[See Ch. 1]

4.5 niṣkāraṇaṃ punā rūpaṃ naiva naivopapadyate / tasmād rūpagatān kāṃścin na vikalpān vikalpayet // MMK_4.5 //

Furthermore, form without a cause is absolutely inappropriate. Therefore, one should not discriminatively think (vikalpa) of any form at all.

4.6 na kāraṇasya sadṛśaṃ kāryam ity upapadyate / na kāraṇasyāsadṛśaṃ kāryam ity upapadyate // MMK_4.6 //

To say that the effect is identical with the cause is not appropriate. To say that the effect is not identical with the cause is also not appropriate.

4.7 vedanācittasaṃjñānāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ ca sarvaśaḥ / sarveṣām eva bhāvānāṃ rūpeṇaiva samaḥ kramaḥ // MMK_4.7 //

Regarding all existents such as sensation, thought (citta), perception, and conditioning They are in every way similar to that of material form.

4.8 vigrahe yaḥ parīhāraṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet / sarvaṃ tasyāparihṛtaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate // MMK_4.8 //

When an analysis (vigraha) is made in terms of emptiness, whosoever were to refute, That refutation will fail, since it will presuppose what is to be proven.

4.9 vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet / sarvaṃ tasyānupālabdhaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate // MMK_4.9 //

When an explanation (vyākhyāna) is given in terms of emptiness, whosoever were to find fault, Finds no fault, since it will presuppose what is to be proven.

CHAPTER FIVE: Realms / Dhātu

5.1 nākāśaṃ vidyate kiṃcit pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt / alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyeta syāt pūrvaṃ yadi lakṣaṇāt // MMK_5.1 //

No space is found prior to the characteristic of spaciousness. If it exists prior to the characteristic, then it would follow that it is without characteristics.

5.2 alakṣaṇo na kaścic ca bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kva cit / asaty alakṣaṇe bhāve kramatāṃ kuha lakṣaṇam // MMK_5.2 //

An existent (bhāva) that is without characteristics is nowhere found. When an existent without characteristics does not exist, where can characteristics appear?

5.3 nālakṣaṇe lakṣaṇasya pravṛttir na salakṣaṇe / salakṣaṇālakṣaṇābhyāṃ nāpy anyatra pravartate // MMK_5.3 //

The occurrence of a characteristic does not take place either in something without characteristic or in something with characteristic. Nor does it proceed from something other than those with or without characteristic.

5.4 lakṣaṇāsaṃpravṛttau ca na lakṣyam upapadyate / lakṣyasyānupapattau ca lakṣaṇasyāpy asaṃbhavaḥ // MMK_5.4 //

When characteristics do not occur, the characterized is not appropriate. In the absence of the characterized, there is no occurrence of characteristics.

5.5 tasmān na vidyate lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ naiva vidyate / lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto naiva bhāvo 'pi vidyate // MMK_5.5 //

Therefore, the characterized is not found. Neither is the characteristic found. Distinct from the characterized and the characteristic, an existent (bhāva) is certainly not found.

5.6 avidyamāne bhāve ca kasyābhāvo bhaviṣyati / bhāvābhāvavidharmā ca bhāvābhāvāv avaiti kaḥ // MMK_5.6 //

When an existent is not found, whose non-existence can there be? Apart from existent and non-existent things, who knows existence and non-existence?

5.7 tasmānna bhāvo nābhāvo na lakṣyaṃ nāpi lakṣaṇam / ākāśam ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye 'pare // MMK_5.7 //

Therefore space is neither an existent nor a non-existent; neither the characterized nor the characteristic. The other five elements are similar to space.

[i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness]

5.8 astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ / bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivam // MMK_5.8 //

Those who are of little intelligence, who perceive the existence (astitva) as well as the non-existence of existents, do not perceive the appeasement of what is seen the auspicious (śiva).

CHAPTER SIX: Desire and the Desirous / Rāga-rakta

6.1 rāgād yadi bhavet pūrvaṃ rakto rāgatiraskṛtaḥ / taṃ pratītya bhaved rāgo rakte rāgo bhavet sati // MMK_6.1 //

If prior to desire (rāga) there were a desirous one (rakta), separated from desire, Then desire would depend upon that person. Desire would exist when there is a desirous one.

6.2 rakte 'sati punā rāgaḥ kuta eva bhaviṣyati / sati vāsati vā rāge rakte 'py eṣa samaḥ kramaḥ // MMK_6.2 //

When a desirous one does not exist, where can there be desire? Whether desire exists or not, the same could be said of the desirous one.

[i.e. If there were no desire, how could there be a ‘desirous’ one?]

6.3 sahaiva punar udbhūtir na yuktā rāgaraktayoḥ / bhavetāṃ rāgaraktau hi nirapekṣau parasparam // MMK_6.3 //

Again, the simultaneous occurrence (sahaiva udbhūtir) of desire and the desirous one is not proper. Desire and the desirous one would then be mutually non-contingent.

[It’s not that desire and the person exist independently, and then they get together to make ‘a desirous one.’]

6.4 naikatve sahabhāvo 'sti na tenaiva hi tat saha / pṛthaktve sahabhāvo 'tha kuta eva bhaviṣyati // MMK_6.4 //

In identity, there is no simultaneity (sahabhāva). What is identical to itself does not arise with itself. In discreteness, how can there be simultaneity (’co-existence’)?

6.5 ekatve sahabhāvaś cet syāt sahāyaṃ vināpi saḥ / pṛthaktve sahabhāvaś cet syāt sahāyaṃ vināpi saḥ // MMK_6.5 //

If, in identity, there were to be simultaneity, it could occur even without association. If, in discreteness, there were to be simultaneity, it could occur even without association.

[Garfield’s example of the oath/inauguration taking place separately.]

6.6 pṛthaktve sahabhāvaś ca yadi kiṃ rāgaraktayoḥ / siddhaḥ pṛthakpṛthagbhāvaḥ sahabhāvo yatas tayoḥ // MMK_6.6 //

If there were to be simultaneity in discreteness, is it the case that desire and the desirous one are completely separated, as a result of which their simultaneity is also established.

6.7 siddhaḥ pṛthakpṛthagbhāvo yadi vā rāgaraktayoḥ / sahabhāvaṃ kimartham tu parikalpayase tayoḥ // MMK_6.7 //

If complete separation between desire and the desirous one is established, for what purpose do you conceive of their simultaneity?

6.8 pṛthag na sidhyatīty evaṃ sahabhāvaṃ vikāṅkṣasi / sahabhāvaprasiddhyarthaṃ pṛthaktvaṃ bhūya icchasi // MMK_6.8 //

You posit simultaneity assuming that the discrete is not established. You, again, look for discreteness for the purpose of establishing simultaneity.

6.9 pṛthagbhāvāprasiddheś ca sahabhāvo na sidhyati / katamasmin pṛthagbhāve sahabhāvaṃ satīcchasi // MMK_6.9 //

When discreteness is not established, simultaneity is not established. In the presence of what kind of discreteness would you expect simultaneity.

[Once we think of entities and their properties as independently characterized things, we can make no sense of how they fit together temporally, logically, or ontologically.]

6.10 evaṃ raktena rāgasya siddhir na saha nāsaha / rāgavat sarvadharmāṇāṃ siddhir na saha nāsaha // MMK_6.10 //

Thus, with or without the desirous one, there is no establishment of desire. Like desire, there is no establishment of anything with or without [accompaniments].

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Conditioned / Saṃskṛta

1. yadi saṃskṛta utpādas tatra yuktā trilakṣaṇī / athāsaṃskṛta utpādaḥ kathaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam // MMK_7.1 //

If arising (utpāda) is conditioned (saṃskṛta), therein three characteristics are proper. If arising is unconditioned, how can there be characteristics of the conditioned?

[i.e. If arising/birth is conditioned, it too has the three marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing.]

2. utpādādyās trayo vyastā nālaṃ lakṣaṇakarmaṇi / saṃskṛtasya samastāḥ syur ekatra katham ekadā // MMK_7.2 //

When the triad consisting of arising, (abiding, and ceasing) are discrete, they are not adequate to function as characteristics of the conditioned. If they were to be combined, how can they be in the same place at the same time?

3. utpādasthitibhaṅgānām anyat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam / asti ced anavasthaivaṃ nāsti cet te na saṃskṛtāḥ // MMK_7.3 //

If there were to be a characteristic of the conditioned other than arising, abiding and ceasing, there would be infinite regress. If there were to be no such [characteristics], these would not be conditioned.

[In other words, if there’s the arising of arising, then there is the arising of the arising of arising, etc. etc.]

4. utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya kevalam / utpādotpādam utpādo maulo janayate punaḥ // MMK_7.4 //

The arising of arising is exclusively the arising of primary arising (mūla-utpada). Again, the primary arising produces the arising of arising.

[This is the opponent speaking. The mūla-utpada is the idea of a ‘prime mover’ or initial cause]

5. utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya te yadi / maulenājanitas taṃ te sa kathaṃ janayiṣyati // MMK_7.5 //

If arising of arising is the primary arising, not being produced by the primary, how can it (the former) produce that (the latter)?

[So, does the mūla-utpada arise from an even more primary cause?]

6. sa te maulena janito maulaṃ janayate yadi / maulaḥ sa tenājanitas tam utpādayate katham // MMK_7.6 //

If, produced by the primary, it produces the primary, how can that primary, not produced by it, produce it?

[If the primary arising is held to arise in dependence on other dependently originated phenomena, and dependent arising is explained as dependent upon the primary arising, then the basis is posited as dependent upon that which it explains.]

7. ayam utpādyamānas te kāmam utpādayed imam / yadīmam utpādayitum ajātaḥ śaknuyād ayam // MMK_7.7 //

If this nonarisen is able to produce that, Then, as you wish, it gives rise to that which is arising.

[This is the opponent again. Nāgārjuna is providing his own description of the Sautrāntika theory of change.]

8. pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayate yathā / utpādaḥ svaparātmānāv ubhāv utpādayet tathā // MMK_7.8 //

As a light illuminates itself as well as others, so does arising produce both itself and others.

9. pradīpe nāndhakāro 'sti yatra cāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ / kiṃ prakāśayate dīpaḥ prakāśo hi tamovadhaḥ // MMK_7.9 //

There exists no darkness either in the light or in whatever place it is situated. What does light illuminate? For, illumination is indeed the destruction of darkness.

[Darkness is not a thing. For Nagarjuna, light and darkness are relative ideas.]

10. katham utpadyamānena pradīpena tamo hatam / notpadyamāno hi tamaḥ pradīpaḥ prāpnute yadā // MMK_7.10 //

How can darkness be destroyed by the emergent light, when the emerging light, indeed, does not teach darkness?

[Light and dark never occupy the same place.]

11. aprāpyaiva pradīpena yadi vā nihataṃ tamaḥ / ihasthaḥ sarvalokasthaṃ sa tamo nihaniṣyati // MMK_7.11 //

On the contrary, if darkness is destroyed by light without reaching it, then that [light] remaining here will destroy the darkness present in all the worlds.

[If light can destroy darkness without reaching it, the implication would be that any spark of light anywhere can destroy the darkness present in the entire universe.]

12. pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayate yadi / tamo 'pi svaparātmānau chādayiṣyaty asaṃśayam // MMK_7.12 //

If light were to illuminate both itself and other, then certainly darkness too will conceal itself and others.

[If light illuminates itself, darkness should conceal itself and you shouldn’t see it.]

13. anutpanno 'yam utpādaḥ svātmānaṃ janayet katham / athotpanno janayate jāte kiṃ janyate punaḥ // MMK_7.13 //

How can this non-arisen arising produce itself? If it is the arisen that produces, then being born, what is it that is produced again?

14. notpadyamānaṃ notpannaṃ nānutpannaṃ kathaṃ cana / utpadyate tad ākhyātaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ // MMK_7.14 //

Neither the present arising, nor the already arisen, nor the non-arisen, is being arisen in any way. This has already been explained by means of [the concepts of] present moving, the moved and the not yet moved.

[See Chapter Two]

15. utpadyamānam utpattāv idaṃ na kramate yadā / katham utpadyamānaṃ tu pratītyotpattim ucyate // MMK_7.15 //

When this present arising does not proceed from within arising, indeed, how can the present arising be spoken of as dependent arising?

16. pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ / tasmād utpadyamānaṃ ca śāntam utpattir eva ca // MMK_7.16 //

Whatever that comes to be dependently, that is inherently peaceful (śānti). Therefore, that which is presently arising as well as arising itself are peaceful.

17. yadi kaścid anutpanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kva cit / utpadyeta sa kiṃ tasmin bhāva utpadyate 'sati // MMK_7.17 //

If a certain non-arisen existent (bhāva) is found somewhere, then that would arise. When such a thing does not exist, how can an existent arise?

18. utpadyamānam utpādo yadi cotpādayaty ayam / utpādayet tam utpādam utpādaḥ katamaḥ punaḥ // MMK_7.18 //

If arising were to produce this present arising, which arising would again produce that arising of that arising?

19. anya utpādayaty enaṃ yady utpādo 'navasthitiḥ / athānutpāda utpannaḥ sarvam utpadyatāṃ tathā // MMK_7.19 //

If this arising were to produce another, arising would turn out to be infinite regression. If the non-arising is arisen, then it will produce everything in this manner.

20. sataś ca tāvad utpattir asataś ca na yujyate / na sataś cāsataś ceti pūrvam evopapāditam // MMK_7.20 //

As such, neither the arising of an existent nor the arising of a non-existent is proper. Even so is the arising of that which is both existent and nonexistent, and this has been previously explained.

21. nirudhyamānasyotpattir na bhāvasyopapadyate / yaś cānirudhyamānas tu sa bhāvo nopapadyate // MMK_7.21 //

The arising of an existent that is ceasing is not appropriate. Whatever existent that is non-arising, that existent too is not appropriate.

22. nāsthitas tiṣṭhate bhāvaḥ sthito bhāvo na tiṣṭhati / na tiṣṭhate tiṣṭhamānaḥ ko 'nutpannaś ca tiṣṭhati // MMK_7.22 //

An existent that has endured is not stationary, nor is an existent that has not endured. The presently enduring is not stationary. What non-arisen can stay?

23. sthitir nirudhyamānasya na bhāvasyopapadyate / yaś cānirudhyamānas tu sa bhāvo nopapadyate // MMK_7.23 //

Duration of an existent that is ceasing is not appropriate. Whatever existent that is non-ceasing is also not.appropriate.

24. jarāmaraṇadharmeṣu sarvabhāveṣu sarvadā / tiṣṭhanti katame bhāvā ye jarāmaraṇaṃ vinā // MMK_7.24 //

When all existents are always of the nature of decay and death, which existents that are without decay and death can stay?

25. sthityānyayā sthiteḥ sthānaṃ tayaiva ca na yujyate / utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā // MMK_7.25 //

The-endurance of an enduring thing based on the endurance of itself or of another is not proper It is like the absence of arising of arising, either from itself or from another.

26. nirudhyate nāniruddhaṃ na niruddhaṃ nirudhyate / tathā nirudhyamānaṃ ca kim ajātaṃ nirudhyate // MMK_7.26 //

That which has not ceased does not cease. That which has ceased also does not cease. Even so is that which is ceasing. Is it the unborn that ceases?

27. sthitasya tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate / nāsthitasyāpi bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate // MMK_7.27 //

The cessation of an existent that has endured is not appropriate. The cessation of an existent that has not endured is also not appropriate.

28. tayaivāvasthayāvasthā na hi saiva nirudhyate / anyayāvasthayāvasthā na cānyaiva nirudhyate // MMK_7.28 //

Indeed, a certain state [of existence] does not cease from a state identical with its own. Nor does a state [of existence] cease from another state different from its own.

29. yadaiva sarvadharmāṇām utpādo nopapadyate / tadaivaṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ nirodho nopapadyate // MMK_7.29 //

Indeed, when the arising of all things is not appropriate, Then the cessation of all things is also not appropriate.

30. sataś ca tāvad bhāvasya nirodho nopapadyate / ekatve na hi bhāvaś ca nābhāvaś copapadyate // MMK_7.30 //

Furthermore, the cessation of a real existent is not appropriate. Indeed, in the context of identity, neither existence nor non-existence is appropriate.

31. asato 'pi na bhāvasya nirodha upapadyate / na dvitīyasya śirasaś chedanaṃ vidyate yathā // MMK_7.31 //

The cessation of an unreal existent is also not appropriate, just as a second beheading [of a person] is not found.

32. na svātmanā nirodho 'sti nirodho na parātmanā / utpādasya yathotpādo nātmanā na parātmanā // MMK_7.32 //

There is no cessation by itself or by another entity, just as the arising of arising is neither by itself nor by another.

33 utpādasthitibhaṅgānām asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtam / saṃskṛtasyāprasiddhau ca kathaṃ setsyaty asaṃskṛtam // MMK_7.33 //

With the non-establishment of arising, duration and destruction, the conditioned does not exist. With the non-establishment of the conditioned, how could there be the unconditioned?

34. yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaraṃ yathā / tathotpādas tathā sthānaṃ tathā bhaṅga udāhṛtam // MMK_7.34 //

As an illusion, a dream, a city of the gandharvas, so have arising, endurance and destruction been exemplified.

CHAPTER EIGHT: Action and Agent / Karma-kāraka

1. sadbhūtaḥ kārakaḥ karma sadbhūtaṃ na karotyayam / kārako nāpy asadbhūtaḥ karmāsadbhūtam īhate // MMK_8.1 //

This really existent agent does not perform a really existent action. Neither is it intended that a really non-existent agent performs a really non-existent action.

[This is Nāgārjuna stating his Madhyamikan position regarding action (karma) and a performer of action. Neither action nor agent will come out to be inherently existent. Nor will either end up being completely non-existent.]

2. sadbhūtasya kriyā nāsti karma ca syād akartṛkam / sadbhūtasya kriyā nāsti kartā ca syād akarmakaḥ // MMK_8.2 //

A really existent entity has no activity. Therefore, action would be without an agent. A really existent entity has no activity. Therefore, even an agent would be without action.

[This is similar to logic Nāgārjuna uses in Chapter Two, verse 6-7 regarding the inseparable natures of motion and the moving object. This denies existence.]

3. karoti yady asadbhūto 'sadbhūtaṃ karma kārakaḥ / ahetukaṃ bhavet karma kartā cāhetuko bhavet // MMK_8.3 //

If a non-existent agent were to perform a non-existent action, the action would be without a cause, and the agent too would be without a cause.

[This denies non-existence.]

4. hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate / tadabhāve kriyā kartā kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate // MMK_8.4 //

When a cause does not exist, both the effect and the sufficient condition are not found. When these are non-existent, activity, agent and performance of action are also not found.

5. dharmādharmau na vidyete kriyādīnām asaṃbhave / dharme cāsaty adharme ca phalaṃ tajjaṃ na vidyate // MMK_8.5 //

With the non-occurrence of activity, etc., things (dharma) and non-things (adharma) are also not found. When both things and non-things do not exist, a fruit arising from these would also not be found.

6. phale 'sati na mokṣāya na svargāyopapadyate / mārgaḥ sarvakriyāṇāṃ ca nairarthakyaṃ prasajyate // MMK_8.6 //

When the fruit does not exist, the path of liberation or of heaven is not appropriate. This would imply the futility of all activity.

7. kārakaḥ sadasadbhūtaḥ sadasat kurute na tat / parasparaviruddhaṃ hi sac cāsac caikataḥ kutaḥ // MMK_8.7 //

An agent who is both existent and non-existent does not perform an action that is both existent and non-existent, for they are self-contradictory. Where can existence and non-existence co-exist?

8. satā ca kriyate nāsan nāsatā kriyate ca sat / kartrā sarve prasajyante doṣās tatra ta eva hi // MMK_8.8 //

A non-existent action is not performed by a presendy existing agent. Nor is an existent action performed by a presently non-existent agent. Indeed, if that were to be the case, all errors relating to the agents [mentioned earlier] would follow.

9. nāsadbhūtaṃ na sadbhūtaḥ sadasadbhūtam eva vā / karoti kārakaḥ karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ // MMK_8.9 //

For reasons stated above, an agent who has come to be existent Does not perform an action that is non-existent or both existent and non-existent.

10 nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtaṃ sadasadbhūtam eva vā / karoti kārakaḥ karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ // MMK_8.10 //

For reasons stated above, an agent who has come to· be non-existent Does not perform an action that is existent or both existent and non-existent.

11. karoti sadasadbhūto na san nāsac ca kārakaḥ / karma tat tu vijānīyāt pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ // MMK_8.11 //

An agent that has come to be both existent and non-existent Does not perform an action that exists and does not exist. This too should be understood in terms of the reasons adduced above.

12. pratītya kārakaḥ karma taṃ pratītya ca kārakam / karma pravartate nānyat paśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇam // MMK_8.12 //

An agent proceeds depending upon action and action proceeds depending upon the agent. We do not perceive any other way of establishing (them).

13. evaṃ vidyād upādānaṃ vyutsargād iti karmaṇaḥ / kartuś ca karmakartṛbhyāṃ śeṣān bhāvān vibhāvayet // MMK_8.13 //

Following this method of the rejection of agent and action, one should understand grasping (upādāna). The remaining existents should be critically examined in terms of the concepts of action and agent.

CHAPTER NINE: Prior entities / Pūrva

1. darśanaśravaṇādīni vedanādīni cāpy atha / bhavanti yasya prāg ebhyaḥ so 'stīty eke vadantyuta // MMK_9.1 //

"Since seeing, hearing, etc. and sensation, etc. exist, the one who has and uses them must exist prior to these." So do some declare.

2. kathaṃ hy avidyamānasya darśanādi bhaviṣyati / bhāvasya tasmāt prāg ebhyaḥ so 'sti bhāvo vyavasthitaḥ // MMK_9.2 //

If there were no existent thing, how can there be seeing, etc.? Therefore, it is determined that, prior to these things, such an existent is.

3. darśanaśravaṇādibhyo vedanādibhya eva ca / yaḥ prāg vyavasthito bhāvaḥ kena prajñapyate 'tha saḥ // MMK_9.3 //

Whatever existent is determined as existing prior to seeing, hearing, etc., and also feeling, etc., by what means is it known?

4. vināpi darśanādīni yadi cāsau vyavasthitaḥ / amūny api bhaviṣyanti vinā tena na saṃśayaḥ // MMK_9.4 //

If it is determined as existing even without seeing, etc., undoubtedly even these [i.e., seeing, etc.] will exist [independently] without it.

[i.e. if there can exist someone independent of the act of seeing, hearing, smelling, etc., the there can exist the act of seeing independent of one doing the seeing.]

5. ajyate kenacit kaścit kiṃcit kena cid ajyate / kutaḥ kiṃcid vinā kaścit kiṃcit kiṃcid vinā kutaḥ // MMK_9.5 //

Someone is made known by something. Something is made known by someone. How could there be someone without something and something without someone?

[Pure subjectivity is a contradiction in adjecto.]

6. sarvebhyo darśanādibhyaḥ kaścit pūrvo na vidyate / ajyate darśanādinām anyena punar anyadā // MMK_9.6 //

Someone is not found prior to seeing, etc. Again, on different occasions, one could be made known by things different from seeing, etc.

7. sarvebhyo darśanādibhyo yadi pūrvo na vidyate / ekaikasmāt kathaṃ pūrvo darśanādeḥ sa vidyate // MMK_9.7 //

If someone existing prior to all of seeing, etc. is not found, how can someone existing prior to each of seeing, etc. be found.

8. draṣṭā sa eva sa śrotā sa eva yadi vedakaḥ / ekaikasmād bhavet pūrvam evaṃ caitan na yujyate // MMK_9.8 //

If a seer is, at the same time, a hearer and feeler, then someone would exist prior to each one [of the functions]. But this is not proper.

9. draṣṭānya eva śrotānyo vedako 'nyaḥ punar yadi / sati syād draṣṭari śrotā bahutvaṃ cātmanāṃ bhavet // MMK_9.9 //

If seer and hearer and feeler are different, then, when there is a seer, there also would be a hearer, and as such there would be a plurality of selves.

10. darśanaśravaṇādīni vedanādīni cāpy atha / bhavanti yebhyas teṣv eṣa bhūteṣv api na vidyate // MMK_9.10 //

It [i.e., the self] is not found in the elements from which seeing, hearing, etc., and feeling, etc. come to be.

11. darśanaśravaṇādīni vedanādīni cāpy atha / na vidyate ced yasya sa na vidyanta imāny api // MMK_9.11 //

If the one to whom belongs seeing, hearing, etc. and feeling, etc., is not found, then even these would not be evident

12. prāk ca yo darśanādibhyaḥ sāṃprataṃ cordhvam eva ca / na vidyate 'sti nāstīti nivṛttās tatra kalpanāḥ // MMK_9.12 //

Wherein someone prior to, simultaneous with, or posterior to, seeing, etc. is not found, therein thoughts of existence and non-existence are also renounced. ·

CHAPTER TEN: Fire and Fuel / Agnīndhana

1. yad indhanaṃ sa ced agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ / anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet // MMK_10.1 //

If fire were to be fuel, then there would be identity of agent and action. If fire were to be different from fuel, then it would exist even without the fuel.

[Some early Buddhist schools argued that things such as action and consciousness were like fire, ‘burning’ in dependence upon the body of form. Nagarjuna asks, ‘Does fire burn [of] itself? If fire and fuel are different, can you have a fire without fuel? Does it make sense to call something fuel if there’s no fire? ]

2. nityapradīpta eva syād apradīpanahetukaḥ / punarārambhavaiyarthyam evaṃ cākarmakaḥ sati // MMK_10.2 //

A burning without a cause would be eternally aflame. Furthermore, its commencement will be rendered meaningless [useless]. When that happens, it will be without a function.

[If fire had independent, inherent existence it would not be caused and would be every lit.

3. paratra nirapekṣatvād apradīpanahetukaḥ / punarārambhavaiyarthyaṃ nityadīptaḥ prasajyate // MMK_10.3 //

A burning without a cause, because it is not dependent on another and, therefore, eternally aflame, would imply the meaninglessness of its commencement.

[If burning had no cause and is independent, there would be no ‘catching fire.’ Again, it would be ever lit.]

4. tatraitat syād idhyamānam indhanaṃ bhavatīti cet / kenedhyatām indhanaṃ tat tāvanmātram idaṃ yadā // MMK_10.4 //

Herein, if it is assumed that fuel is what is presently burning and, therefore, that [i.e., burning] is merely this [i.e. fuel), by what is fuel being burnt?

5. anyo na prāpsyate 'prapto na dhakṣyaty adahan punaḥ / na nirvāsyaty anirvāṇaḥ sthāsyate vā svaliṅgavān // MMK_10.5 //

[Fuel] that is different is not reached; the unreached is not ignited. Furthermore, that which is not ignited does, not cease. That which does not cease remains, like one that has its own mark.

6. anya evandhanād agnir indhanaṃ prāpnuyād yadi / strī saṃprāpnoti puruṣaṃ puruṣaś ca striyaṃ yathā // MMK_10.6 //

If fire is different from fuel it would reach the fuel, just as a woman would reach for a man and a man for a woman.

7. anya evendhanād agnir indhanaṃ kāmam āpnuyāt / agnīndhane yadi syātām anyonyena tiraskṛte // MMK_10.7 //

The fuel that is different from fuel may reach the fuel only if fire and fuel were to exist mutually separated.

8. yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgniṃ yadīndhanam / katarat pūrvaniṣpannaṃ yad apekṣyāgnir indhanam // MMK_10.8 //

If fuel is dependent (apekṣā) upon fuel and fuel upon fire, which of them is pre-accomplished so that fire could be dependent upon fuel?

9. yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir agneḥ siddhasya sādhanam / evaṃ satīndhanaṃ cāpi bhaviṣyati niragnikam // MMK_10.9 //

If fire depends upon fuel, there would be proof of fire that is already proved [to exist]. When that is the case, even fuel would exist without fire.

10. yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sidhyati / yadi yo 'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sidhyatāṃ kam apekṣya kaḥ // MMK_10.10 //

If that upon which an entity depends is established on the basis of the entity depending upon it, of the entity depending on it, what is established in dependence on what?

[If a thing (A) is established dependently (on B), [but] if what it depends upon (B) is established also in dependence on that very thing (A), what would be established in dependence on what?

11. yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham / athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāsya na yujyate // MMK_10.11 //

Whatever existent that is established through dependence, how can that, if it is not yet established, be dependent? Even so [how can] that which is already established be dependent? For, its dependence is not proper.

12. apekṣyendhanam agnir na nānapekṣyāgnir indhanam / apekṣyendhanam agniṃ na nānapekṣyāgnim indhanam // MMK_10.12 //

Fire is not dependent upon fuel; fire is not non-dependent upon fuel. Fuel is not dependent upon fire; fuel is not non-dependent upon fire.

13. āgacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate / atrendhane śeṣam uktaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ // MMK_10.13 //

Fire does not come out of something different nor is fire seen to be in the fuel. Herein, with regard to fuel, the rest is stated as in the case of present moving, the moved and the not moved.

[See Chapter Two]

14. indhanaṃ punar agnir na nāgnir anyatra cendhanāt / nāgnir indhanavān nāgnāv indhanāni na teṣu saḥ // MMK_10.14 //

Furthermore, fuel is not fire. Apart from fuel there is no fire. Fire is not possessed of fuel. Fuel is not in the fuel, nor is it [i.e., fire] in them.

15. agnīndhanābhyāṃ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramaḥ / sarvo niravaśeṣeṇa sārdhaṃ ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ // MMK_10.15 //

Through the examples of fire and fuel, together with the examples of pot, cloth, etc. every method of analysis of the self and grasping have been explained without exception.

[This analysis is not confined to the metaphor of "fuel and fuel" alone. It applies to all other metaphors used during this period of speculation, such as "clay and the pot," and "thread and the cloth."

16. ātmanaś ca satattvaṃ ye bhāvānāṃ ca pṛthak pṛthak / nirdiśanti na tān manye śāsanasyārthakovidān // MMK_10.16 //

Those who posit the substantiality of the self (ātman) as well as of discrete existents- these I do not consider to be experts in the meaning of the [Buddha's) message.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: Prior and Terminal Limits / Pūrvāparakoṭi

1. pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ / saṃsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam // MMK_11.1 //

The Great Sage has stated that the prior limit is not known. Saṃsāra is without beginning and end. There is neither a beginning nor an end.

2. naivāgraṃ nāvaraṃ yasya tasya madhyaṃ kuto bhavet / tasmān nātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāḥ // MMK_11.2 //

How could there be the middle of that which has neither a beginning nor an end? Therefore, the methods of (distinguishing) before, after, or both together (i.e., simultaneity) are not appropriate.

[It’s like wondering where to hide from imaginary assailants. It’s already a wrong question.]

3. pūrvaṃ jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam uttaram / nirjarā maraṇā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ // MMK_11.3 //

If birth came first, and decay and death (jarāmaraṇa) were to follow, Then birth would be ageless and deathless, and an immortal would thus emerge.

[There is birth, but not the birth of some thing, some entity. Birth is not the birth of a being. This and the following should be considered in light of the 12-link chain of causation.]

4. paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam āditaḥ / ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaraṇaṃ katham // MMK_11.4 //

If birth came after, and decay and death before, Decay and death would be without a primary condition (hetu), and how could there be decay and death of something not born?

5. na jarāmaraṇaṃ caiva jātiś ca saha yujyate / mriyeta jāyamānaś ca syāc cāhetukatobhayoḥ // MMK_11.5 //

Indeed, decay and death as concomitant of birth is not proper. Then, what is being born is also dying and both would be rendered causeless.

[Simultaneity is meaningless.]

6. yatra na prabhavanty ete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ / prapañcayanti tāṃ jātiṃ taj jarāmaraṇaṃ ca kim // MMK_11.6 //

Wherever such methods of (discriminating) before, after, and the simultaneous do not arise, why be obsessed about (why fabricate) such ideas as birth, and decay and death?

7. kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇam eva ca / vedanā vedakaś caiva santy arthā ye ca ke cana // MMK_11.7 //

Effect and cause as well as characterized and characteristic, together with feeling and feeler or whatever fruits there are,

8. pūrvā na vidyate koṭiḥ saṃsārasya na kevalam / sarveṣām api bhāvānāṃ pūrvā koṭī na vidyate // MMK_11.8 //

The prior limit (beginning) of these is not found. Of the entirety of saṃsāra as well as of all existents, the prior limit is not found.

CHAPTER TWELVE: Suffering / Duḥkha

1. svayaṃ kṛtaṃ parakṛtaṃ dvābhyāṃ kṛtam ahetukam / duḥkham ity eka icchanti tac ca kāryaṃ na yujyate // MMK_12.1 //

Some assume that suffering is self-produced, produced by another, produced by both, or is without a cause. Such suffering is indeed not appropriate.

2. svayaṃ kṛtaṃ yadi bhavet pratītya na tato bhavet / skandhān imān amī skandhāḥ saṃbhavanti pratītya hi // MMK_12.2 //

lf [suffering] were self-produced, then it would not occur dependently. Indeed, depending upon these aggregates, these other aggregates occur.

3. yady amībhya ime 'nye syur ebhyo vāmī pare yadi / bhavet parakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ parair ebhir amī kṛtāḥ // MMK_12.3 //

If from these those that are different were to come to be, or if from those these different [things] were to come to be, then suffering would be caused by another, for these are caused by those that are different.

[Just as svabhāva is dependent upon parabhāva and vice-versa, here para-kṛta (produced of another) is shown to be dependent upon sva-kṛta, which was just refuted.]

4. svapudgalakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi duḥkhaṃ punar vinā / svapudgalaḥ sa katamo yena duḥkhaṃ svayaṃ kṛtam // MMK_12.4 //

If suffering is produced by one’s own person (svapudgala), then that own person can exist without suffering. Who is it that exists distinct from suffering?

[As always, Nāgārjuna is attempting to locate the quality as distinct from the object.]

5. parapudgalajaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi yasmai pradīyate / pareṇa kṛtvā tad duḥkhaṃ sa duḥkhena vinā kutaḥ // MMK_12.5 //

If suffering were to be produced by one person and given over to another, that suffering is caused by the former. How can the latter be identified without suffering?

6. parapudgalajaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi kaḥ parapudgalaḥ / vinā duḥkhena yaḥ kṛtvā parasmai prahiṇoti tat // MMK_12.6 //

If suffering is produced by another person, who is that other person who, without suffering, produces it and bestows it on another?

7. svayaṃ kṛtasyāprasiddher duḥkhaṃ parakṛtaṃ kutaḥ / paro hi duḥkhaṃ yat kuryāt tat tasya syāt svayaṃ kṛtam // MMK_12.7 //

With the non-establishment of self-production, how can there be suffering caused by another? For, indeed, if another were to produce that suffering, in relation to him it would be self-produced.

[If there’s no ‘self’ production of suffering then there can’t be other-production (parakṛta) because for that person, it would be self produced, and that’s already been disputed.]

8. na tāvat svakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ na hi tenaiva tat kṛtam / paro nātmakṛtaś cet syād duḥkhaṃ parakṛtaṃ katham // MMK_12.8 //

Suffering is not self-produced, it is, indeed, not produced of itself. The other is not produced of itself. How could suffering be produced by another?

9. syād ubhābhyāṃ kṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ syād ekaikakṛtaṃ yadi / parākārāsvayaṃkāraṃ duḥkham ahetukaṃ kutaḥ // MMK_12.9 //

If suffering were produced by both, it would be produced by each individually. Not self produced or produced by another, how could suffering be without a cause?

10. na kevalaṃ hi duḥkhasya cāturvidhyaṃ na vidyate / bāhyānām api bhāvānāṃ cāturvidhyaṃ na vidyate // MMK_12.10 //

It is not that the fourfold theory applied exclusively to suffering is not found. The fourfold theory pertaining to other existents too is not found.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Conditioning / Saṃskāra

1. tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad bhagavān ity abhāṣata / sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṃskārās tena te mṛṣā // MMK_13.1 //

The Bhagavān has said that whatever is of deceptive nature, that is delusion (mṛṣā). All things that are of deceptive nature involve conditioning (saṃskāra). Therefore, they are delusions.

2. tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad yadi kiṃ tatra muṣyate / etat tūktaṃ bhagavatā śūnyatāparidīpakam // MMK_13.2 //

If, whatever that is of deceptive nature is delusion, what is it about which there is delusion? That too, namely, the illumination of emptiness (śūnyatā), has been spoken of by the Bhagavān.

3. bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam anyathābhāvadarśanāt / nāsvabhāvaś ca bhāvo 'sti bhāvānāṃ śūnyatā yataḥ // MMK_13.3 //

Because of the perception of change, the absence of self-nature of existents is [recognized]. Because of the emptiness of existents, there is no existent without self-nature.

[The fact that ‘things’ change shows they have no self-nature. And to think that there is some thing (something) that has no self-nature is to miss the point.]

4. kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaś cen na vidyate / kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate // MMK_13.4 //

Whose change would there be, if self-nature were not found? Again, whose change would there be, if self-nature were found?

[This verse would seem to anticipate the Yogacara ‘Three Natures.’]

5. tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo nāpy anyasyaiva yujyate / yuvā na jīryate yasmād yasmāj jīrṇo na jīryate // MMK_13.5 //

Neither change of something in itself nor of something different is proper. The reason being that youth does not age nor does aging age.

6. tasya ced anyathābhāvaḥ kṣīram eva bhaved dadhi / kṣīrād anyasya kasyacid dadhibhāvo bhaviṣyati // MMK_13.6 //

If change were to be of something in itself, then milk itself would be butter. Or butter-ness would be something other than milk.

7. yady aśūnyaṃ bhavet kiṃcit syāc chūnyam iti kiṃ cana / na kiṃcid asty aśūnyaṃ ca kutaḥ śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati // MMK_13.7 //

If there were to be something non-empty, there would then be something called empty. However, there is nothing that is non-empty. How could there be something empty?

[Emptiness is not a property/characteristic that a thing might or might not have.]

8. śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ / yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire // MMK_13.8 //

The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who hold emptiness as a view are said to be incorrigible.

[Emptiness is not another view (dṛṣṭī) among views, which is why it ‘defeats’ all views, and why the Buddha is a jina, a Victorious One.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Connection / Saṃsarga

1. draṣṭavyaṃ darśanaṃ draṣṭā trīṇy etāni dviśo dviśaḥ / sarvaśaś ca na saṃsargam anyonyena vrajanty uta // MMK_14.1 //

The object of seeing, the seeing and the seer - these three do not function in mutual connection (saṃsarga) either in pairs or all together.

2. evaṃ rāgaś ca raktaś ca rañjanīyaṃ ca dṛśyatām / traidhena śeṣāḥ kleśāś ca śeṣāṇy āyatanāni ca // MMK_14.2 //

Attraction, the attracted, as well as the object of attraction should be seen in the same way. The remaining defilements as well the remaining spheres of sense should be seen in the triadic mode.

3. anyenānyasya saṃsargas tac cānyatvaṃ na vidyate / draṣṭavyaprabhṛtīnāṃ yan na saṃsargaṃ vrajanty ataḥ // MMK_14.3 //

Connection is of the mutually different [events]. Such difference is not found in the objects of seeing, etc. Therefore, they do not function in mutual connection.

4. na ca kevalam anyatvaṃ draṣṭavyāder na vidyate / kasyacit kenacit sārdhaṃ nānyatvam upapadyate // MMK_14.4 //

Not only is difference with regard to objects of seeing, etc. not found; the possibility of something possessing difference jointly with another is also not appropriate.

5. anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad ṛte 'nyataḥ / yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate // MMK_14.5 //

Different things dependent upon different things for their difference. Different things are not without different things. Because something depends upon something, a different thing is not appropriate.

6. yady anyad anyad anyasmād anyasmād apy ṛte bhavet / tad anyad anyad anyasmād ṛte nāsti ca nāsty ataḥ // MMK_14.6 //

If a thing is different from another because it arises from a different thing, then it would exist even without that other thing. However, that other thing does not exist without the other, and therefore, it does not exist.

7. nānyasmin vidyate 'nyatvam ananyasmin na vidyate / avidyamāne cānyatve nāsty anyad vā tad eva vā // MMK_14.7 //

Difference is not found in relation to a different thing. Nor is it not found in a different thing. When difference is not found, there is neither difference nor identity.

8. na tena tasya saṃsargo nānyenānyasya yujyate / saṃsṛjyamānaṃ saṃsṛṣṭaṃ saṃsraṣṭā ca na vidyate // MMK_14.8 //

The connection between identical things or of different things is not proper. Neither the associating nor the associated nor even the agent of association is found.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Inherent Self-Nature / Svabhāva

1. na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ / hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet // MMK_15.1 //

The occurrence of self-nature (svabhāva) through causes and conditions (pratyayahetu) is not proper. Self-nature that has occurred as a result of causes and conditions would be something that is made.

2. svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham / akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca // MMK_15.2 //

How could there be a self-nature that is made? Indeed, an unmade self-nature is also non-contingent upon another.

[The last part could is also read, “Inherent self-nature is [by definition] not something made, not dependent upon another.]

3. kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati / svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate // MMK_15.3 //

In the absence of self-nature, how can there be other-nature? For, self-nature of other-nature is called other-nature.

[What is ‘other’ is dependent upon what is self. If there is no self, how can there be other?]

4. svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ / svabhāve parabhāve ca sati bhāvo hi sidhyati // MMK_15.4 //

Without self-nature and other-nature, where can there be an existent (bhāva)? For, an existent is established only when there is self-nature or other-nature.

5. bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati / bhāvasya hy anyathābhāvam abhāvaṃ bruvate janāḥ // MMK_15.5 //

When the existent is not established, the non-existent is also not established. It is, indeed, the ‘change of the existent’ (anyathābhāvam) that people generally call the non-existent.

6. svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvam eva ca / ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane // MMK_15.6 //

Those who perceive self-nature as well as other-nature, existence as well as non-existence, they do not perceive the truth embodied in the Buddha's message.

7. kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam / pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā // MMK_15.7 //

In the discourse to Kātyāyana, 'exists' (astitva) and 'does not exist' (nāstitva) have been refuted by the Blessed One who is adept in existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva).

[See Saṃyutta Nikāya 12:15]

8. yady astitvaṃ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā / prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate // MMK_15.8 //

If there was existence in some primordial way (prakṛti), then there would not be non-existence. A change in primordial nature is certainly not appropriate.

9. prakṛtau kasya vāsatyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati / prakṛtau kasya vā satyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati // MMK_15.9 //

When primordial nature is non-existent, of what could there be change? When primordial nature is existent, what change could there be?

10. astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīty ucchedadarśanam / tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ // MMK_15.10 //

‘Exists' implies grasping after eternalism. ‘Does not exist’ implies annihilationsim. Therefore, a discerning person should not rely upon either existence or non-existence.

11. asti yad dhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvatam / nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate // MMK_15.11 //

‘Whatever exists in terms of self-nature, that is not non-existent,' implies eternalism. ’It does not exist now, but existed before.’ implies annihilation.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Bondage and Liberation / Bandhana-mokṣa

1. saṃskārāḥ saṃsaranti cen na nityāḥ saṃsaranti te / saṃsaranti ca nānityāḥ sattve 'py eṣa samaḥ kramaḥ // MMK_16.1 //

If it is assumed that conditioned habits (saṃskāra) transmigrate (saṃsara), they would not transmigrate as permanent entities. Neither do they transmigrate as impermanent entities. This method (of analysis) is applicable even to sentient beings.

[Saṃsara literally means to ‘cycle’ or ‘turn around’ or ‘float about,’ which is then used as a euphemism in Buddhism and other traditions for the specific life-cycle of birth and death. Here there seems to be a double usage going on.

Once again, the 12-links of dependent-origination seem to be the focus of attention here. If there’s no existent, what transmigrates? The habit energy?]

2. pudgalaḥ saṃsarati cet skandhāyatanadhātuṣu / pañcadhā mṛgyamāṇo 'sau nāsti kaḥ saṃsariṣyati // MMK_16.2 //

If it is assumed that a person (pudgala) transmigrates, such a person, sought for in the fivefold way in the aggregates, spheres (of sense) and elements, does not exist. Who then transmigrates?

[Does a personality (pudgala) transmigrate?]

3. upādānād upādānaṃ saṃsaran vibhavo bhavet / vibhavaś cānupādānaḥ kaḥ sa kiṃ saṃsariṣyati // MMK_16.3 //

Moving from one form of grasping (upādāna) to another, there would be other becoming. Who is this person who has ceased to be and is [therefore] non-grasping? Wherein does he transmigrate?

[The idea that there is an inherently existent ‘grasper’ behind the grasping - is the grasper what is transmigrating?]

4. saṃskārāṇāṃ na nirvāṇaṃ kathaṃ cid upapadyate / sattvasyāpi na nirvāṇaṃ kathaṃ cid upapadyate // MMK_16.4 //

The cessation (nirvāṇa) of conditioned habits is somehow not appropriate. The cessation even of a sentient being is also not appropriate in any way.

5. na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharmiṇaḥ / saṃskārāḥ pūrvavat sattvo badhyate na na mucyate // MMK_16.5 //

Conditioned habits that are of the nature of arising and ceasing are neither bound nor released. A sentient being, likewise, is neither bound nor released.

6. bandhanaṃ ced upādānaṃ sopādāno na badhyate / badhyate nānupādānaḥ kimavastho 'tha badhyate // MMK_16.6 //

If grasping were bondage, then one who is grasping is not bound. Neither is one without grasping bound. What then constitutes being bound?

7. badhnīyād bandhanaṃ kāmaṃ bandhyāt pūrvaṃ bhaved yadi / na cāsti tac cheṣam uktaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ // MMK_16.7 //

If it is assumed that bondage exists prior to a state of being bound, that does not exist. The rest has been explained by present moving, the moved, and the not yet moved.

8. baddho na mucyate tāvad abaddho naiva mucyate / syātāṃ baddhe mucyamāne yugapad bandhamokṣaṇe // MMK_16.8 //

One who is bound is not liberated, nor is one who is not bound liberated. When there is releasing of one who is bound, then there would be simultaneous occurrence of bondage and release.

[One who is bound is not in a state of liberation, and someone just walking down the street, not bound, doesn’t have anything to do with ‘being liberated.’ And to talk about going from a state of bondage to liberation would imply a moment of simultaneous bondage and release.]

9. nirvāsyāmy anupādāno nirvāṇaṃ me bhaviṣyati / iti yeṣāṃ grahas teṣām upādānamahāgrahaḥ // MMK_16.9 //

‘Non-grasping, l shall be free. Nirvana will then be mine!’ For whomsoever there is grasping in this manner, that will be a gigantic grasping.

10. na nirvāṇasamāropo na saṃsārāpakarṣaṇam / yatra kas tatra saṃsāro nirvāṇaṃ kiṃ vikalpyate // MMK_16.10 //

Wherein there is neither the attribution of nirvāṇa nor the elimination saṃsāra, what is it that is being discriminated as saṃsāra or as nirvāṇa?

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: Action and Result / Karma-phala

1 ātmasaṃyamakaṃ cetaḥ parānugrāhakaṃ ca yat / maitraṃ sa dharamas tad bījaṃ phalasya pretya ceha ca // MMK_17.1 //

Self-restraint as well as benefitting others - this is the friendly Dharma and constitutes the seed that bears fruit here as well as in the next life.

2. cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktaṃ paramarṣiṇā / tasyānekavidho bhedaḥ karmaṇaḥ parikīrtitaḥ // MMK_17.2 //

The Supreme Ascetic has said that action (karma) is intention (cetanā) and what is intended (cetayitvā). Many distinct varieties of that action have also been expounded.

3. tatra yac cetanety uktaṃ karma tan mānasaṃ smṛtam / cetayitvā ca yat tūktaṃ tat tu kāyikavācikam // MMK_17.3 //

Herein, what is called ‘intention,’ remember, is mental action. Whatever is called intended consists of the bodily and verbal.

4. vāgviṣpando 'viratayo yāś cāvijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ / avijñaptaya evānyāḥ smṛtā viratayas tathā // MMK_17.4 //

Whatever (1) speech and (2) movement, and (3) ‘unconscious not-letting-go’ / unabandoned (4) and other kinds of unconscious letting-go are also regarded like that.

5. paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyam apuṇyaṃ ca tathāvidham / cetanā ceti saptaite dharmāḥ karmāñjanāḥ smṛtāḥ // MMK_17.5 //

(5) Merit (puṇya) that arises from enjoyment and in the same manner (6) what is not goodness, [and] (7) intention. These seven dharmas are clearly regarded as action.

6. tiṣṭhaty ā pākakālāc cet karma tan nityatām iyāt / niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalaṃ janayiṣyati // MMK_17.6 //

If action (karma) remains during the time it is maturing, then it will approach permanence. If it is assumed to have ceased, then having ceased, how can it produce a fruit?

7. yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravartate / tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravartate // MMK_17.7 //

Whatever series (saṃtāna) that begins with a sprout proceeds from a seed, and then produces a fruit. However, without a seed, such [a series] would not proceed.

[The metaphysical assumptions of the Sautrantika doctrine of karma are under review here. The atomistic view of the life-process accepted by the Sautrantikas compelled them to analyze an events into series, saṃtāna.]

8. bījāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ / bījapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // MMK_17.8 //

Since a series arises from a seed and a fruit arises from a series, a fruit that is preceded by a seed is, therefore, neither non-existent nor eternal.

9. yas tasmāc cittasaṃtānaś cetaso 'bhipravartate / tataḥ phalam ṛte cittāt sa ca nābhipravartate // MMK_17.9 //

Therefore, whatever series of thought (citta-saṃtāna) there are, proceeds from a thought and from that fruits. There would be no series of thought without a thought.

10. cittāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ / karmapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // MMK_17.10 //

Since a continuous series arises from thought, and from the continuous series arises fruit, the fruit that is preceded by action is neither interrupted nor eternal.

11. dharmasya sādhanopāyāḥ śuklāḥ karmapathā daśa / phalaṃ kāmaguṇāḥ pañca dharmasya pretya ceha ca // MMK_17.11 //

The ten pure paths of action are the means of achieving the Dharma. The five strands of sense pleasure represent the fruit of the Dharma, here and in the next life.

12. bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣāḥ syur yadi kalpanā / syād eṣā tena naivaiṣā kalpanātropapadyate // MMK_17.12 //

If there were to be such a thought, there would be many a great error. Therefore, such a thought is not appropriate here.

13. imāṃ punaḥ pravakṣyāmi kalpanāṃ yātra yojyate / buddhaiḥ pratyekabuddhaiś ca śrāvakaiś cānuvarṇitām // MMK_17.13 //

I shall then expound the following thought which is appropriate And which has been extolled by Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas and the śrāvakas.

14. pattraṃ yathā 'vipraṇāśastatharṇam iva karma ca / caturvidho dhātutaḥ sa prakṛtyāvyākṛtaś ca saḥ // MMK_17.14 //

Like an imperishable promissory note, as debt so is action (karma). It is fourfold in terms of realms and indeterminate in terms of primal nature.

[Desire, Form, Formless, and the Realm of Liberation]

15. prahāṇato na praheyo bhāvanāheya eva vā / tasmād avipraṇāśena jāyate karmaṇāṃ phalam // MMK_17.15 //

That [i.e., imperishable karma] would not be relinquished by simple relinquishing. It is to be relinquished only through cultivation. Thus, through the imperishable arises the fruit of action.

16. prahāṇataḥ praheyaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ saṃkrameṇa vā / yadi doṣāḥ prasajyeraṃs tatra karmavadhādayaḥ // MMK_17.16 //

If it is to be relinquished through simple relinquishing or through the transformation of action, then there would follow a variety of errors such as the destruction of action.

17. sarveṣāṃ visabhāgānāṃ sabhāgānāṃ ca karmaṇām / pratisaṃdhau sadhātūnām eka utpadyate tu saḥ // MMK_17.17 //

Of all these actions, whether dissimilar or similar, belonging to certain realms, only one would arise at the moment of birth [of a being].

18. karmaṇaḥ karmaṇo dṛṣṭe dharma utpadyate tu saḥ / dviprakārasya sarvasya vipakve 'pi ca tiṣṭhati // MMK_17.18 //

That [imperishable] arises in the present life, corresponding to all the actions having dual natures [similar and dissimilar, good and bad, etc.] and stays so even when ripened.

19. phalavyatikramād vā sa maraṇād vā nirudhyate / anāsravaṃ sāsravaṃ ca vibhāgaṃ tatra lakṣayet // MMK_17.19 //

That [imperishable] ceases as result of the interruption of the fruit or as a result of death. Herein, a distinction between one with taints and the one without taints is to made.

[This concludes Nagarjuna’s presentation of competing Buddhist theories on karma and karmic results]

20. śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ saṃsāraś ca na śāśvatam / karmaṇo 'vipraṇāśaś ca dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ // MMK_17.20 //

Emptiness, however, is not annihilation. Saṃsāra is also not eternal. The imperishability of karma as such is the Dharma taught by the Buddha.

21. karma notpadyate kasmān niḥsvabhāvaṃ yatas tataḥ / yasmāc ca tad anutpannaṃ na tasmād vipraṇaśyati // MMK_17.21 //

Why does karma not arise? Because it is without self-nature. Since it is non-arisen, it does not perish.

[i.e. ‘it’ is not something that perishes]

22. karma svabhāvataś cet syāc chāśvataṃ syād asaṃśayam / akṛtaṃ ca bhavet karma kriyate na hi śāśvatam // MMK_17.22 //

If it is assumed that action comes to be from [having] self-nature, it certainly will be eternal, and action would also be uncreated, for that which is eternal is, indeed, not created.

23. akṛtābhyāgamabhayaṃ syāt karmākṛtakaṃ yadi / abrahmacaryavāsaś ca doṣastatra prasajyate // MMK_17.23 //

If an action were uncreated, there would be fear of encountering the unperformed. Immoral practice (abrahmacarya) would then follow.

[i.e. if there were no such thing as karma at all, then there would be no such thing as ‘moral’]

24. vyavahārā virudhyante sarva eva na saṃśayaḥ / puṇyapāpakṛtor naiva pravibhāgaś ca yujyate // MMK_17.24 //

Undoubtedly, all conventions (vyavahāra) would then be contradicted. The distinction between the performance of merit (puṇya) and evil will also not be proper.

[i.e. indeed, you would have to throw out everything and there would be no ‘good’ or ‘evil.’]

25. tad vipakvavipākaṃ ca punar eva vipakṣyati / karma vyavasthitaṃ yasmāt tasmāt svābhāvikaṃ yadi // MMK_17.25 //

A ripening (vipaka) that has ripened will ripen again and again If action were to be fixed, due to possessing self-nature.

[i.e. if action had inherent self nature it would be unchanging and just be ‘coming to fruition’ all the time.]

26. karma kleśātmakaṃ cedaṃ te ca kleśā na tattvataḥ / na cet te tattvataḥ kleśāḥ karma syāt tattvataḥ katham // MMK_17.26 //

While action is associated with defilements (kleśa), these defilements, in tum, are not found in and of themselves (na tattvataḥ). If defilements are not in and of themselves, how could there be action itself?

27. karma kleśāś ca dehānāṃ pratyayāḥ samudāhṛtāḥ / karma kleśāś ca te śūnyā yadi deheṣu kā kathā // MMK_17.27 //

Action and defilements are taught to be the conditions of bodies (deha). However, if these actions and defilements are empty, how can one speak of bodies?

28. avidyānivṛto jantus tṛṣṇāsaṃyojanaś ca saḥ / sa bhoktā sa ca na kartur anyo na ca sa eva saḥ // MMK_17.28 //

As obstructed by ignorance and also fettered by craving (tṛṣṇa), As experiencer (bhoktā), neither identical with nor different from the agent (kartā).

[i.e. that’s how one can speak of bodies. As bhoktā, ‘the enjoyer’ of the fruit.]

29. na pratyayasamutpannaṃ nāpratyayasamutthitam / asti yasmād idaṃ karma tasmāt kartāpi nāsty ataḥ // MMK_17.29 //

Since this action does not exist as arisen from a condition nor as issuing forth from a non-condition, even an agent does not exist.

30. karma cen nāsti kartā ca kutaḥ syāt karmajaṃ phalam / asaty atha phale bhoktā kuta eva bhaviṣyati // MMK_17.30 //

If both action and agent are non-existent, where could there be the fruit born of action? When there is no fruit, where can there be an experiencer?

31. yathā nirmitakaṃ śāstā nirmimīta rddhisaṃpadā / nirmito nirmimītānyaṃ sa ca nirmitakaḥ punaḥ // MMK_17.31 //

Just as the Teacher, through transcendental powers, creates a transformation And this transformation creates another transformation.

[A classic example used by Nagarjuna and others, part of the ‘Miracles at Sravasti,’ when the Buddha creates transformation bodies to debate a group of heretics, and the when the heretics are rendered speechless by this display of miraculous power, the transformation bodies create transformation bodies to debate with.]

32. tathā nirmitakākāraḥ kartā yat karma tat kṛtam / tadyathā nirmitenānyo nirmito nirmitas tathā // MMK_17.32 //

In the same way, an agent is like a transformation and their action is also like a transformation. Just like a transformation of a transformation.

33. kleśāḥ karmāṇi dehāś ca kartāraś ca phalāni ca / gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ // MMK_17.33 //

Defilements, actions and bodies, agents as well a fruit, All these are similar to the cities of the Gandharvas, comparable to mirages and dreams.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: Self / Ātma

1. ātmā skandhā yadi bhaved udayavyayabhāg bhavet / skandhebhyo 'nyo yadi bhaved bhaved askandhalakṣaṇaḥ // MMK_18.1 //

If the self (ātma) were identical with the aggregates (skandha), it will partake of arising and ceasing. If it were different from the aggregates, it would not be characteristized by the aggregates.

2. ātmany asati cātmīyaṃ kuta eva bhaviṣyati / nirmamo nirahaṃkāraḥ śamād ātmātmanīnayoḥ // MMK_18.2 //

In the absence of a self, how can there be something that belongs to the self (ātmani)? From the appeasement (śama) of modes of self and self-hood (ātma and ātmani), one abstains from creating the notions of ‘mine’ and ‘I’ (nirmama and (nirahaṃkāra).

3. nirmamo nirahaṃkāro yaś ca so 'pi na vidyate / nirmamaṃ nirahaṃkāraṃ yaḥ paśyati na paśyati // MMK_18.3 //

One not creating the notions of ‘mine’ and ‘I’” is not found [nor is] The perception of one not creating the notions of ‘mine and ‘I’ perceived.

4. mamety aham iti kṣīṇe bahirdhādhyātmam eva ca / nirudhyata upādānaṃ tatkṣayāj janmanaḥ kṣayaḥ // MMK_18.4 //

When views of ‘mine’ and ‘I’, whether internal or external, have ceased, The appropriator (grasper) ceases. With that ceasing, birth is extinguished.

5. karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ / te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate // MMK_18.5 //

Upon the extinguishment of action (karma) and defilement (kleśa) there is liberation. Action and defilement are of one who discriminates (vikalpa), Which is the result of mental fabrication (prapañca); Mental fabrication which ceases through emptiness.

6. ātmety api prajñapitam anātmety api deśitam / buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaścid ity api deśitam // MMK_18.6 //

The self is spoken of, and non-self has been taught, Buddhas also teach that there is nothing which is “neither self nor non-self.”

7. nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ / anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā // MMK_18.7 //

When the sphere of thought (citta-gocara) has ceased, that which is to be designated is ceased. Like nirvāṇa, the nature of things (dharmatā) is non-arisen and non-ceased (anutpannāniruddha) .

8. sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyam eva ca / naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanam // MMK_18.8 //

Everything is so, not so, both so and not so, and neither so nor not so. This is the Buddha's admonition.

9. aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam / nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam // MMK_18.9 //

Non-conditionally related to any entity, quiescent, unobsessed by obsessions, Non-discriminative and undifferentiated: such is the Characteristic of Reality.

[Undifferentiated= anānārtha, ‘without the varieties of meanings.’]

10. pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat / na cānyadapi tattasmānnocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam // MMK_18.10 //

Whatever arises depending upon another, that is not identical nor different from it. Therefore, it is neither annihilated nor eternal.

11. anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvatam / etat tal lokanāthānāṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtam // MMK_18.11 //

Without identity or difference, neither annihilated nor eternal. Such, it is recalled, is the immortal message of the Buddhas, the patrons of the world.

12. saṃbuddhānām anutpāde śrāvakāṇāṃ punaḥ kṣaye / jñānaṃ pratyekabuddhānām asaṃsargāt pravartate // MMK_18.12 //

When the fully awakened ones do not appear; and the śrāvakas have disappeared, The wisdom of pratyekabuddhas proceeds without association.

CHAPTER NINETEEN: Time / Kāla

[The conception of time is invariably bound up with notions of karma and the fruition of karma, for the results of actions do not all appear immediately or all at once.]

1. pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca yady atītam apekṣya hi / pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca kāle 'tīte bhaviṣyataḥ // MMK_19.1 //

If the present (pratyutpanna) and the future exist dependent (contingent) upon the past, Then the present and the future would have existed in the past.

[Since it is not ‘the past’ now, if the present and future are dependent upon the past, they must have been present ‘there’ in some way, ‘then,’ perhaps in potentia, yet nonetheless ‘existent’ in some way.]

2. pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi / pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātāṃ katham apekṣya tam // MMK_19.2 //

If the present and the future did not to exist therein (i.e., in the past), How could the present and the future be dependent upon that?

3. anapekṣya punaḥ siddhir nātītaṃ vidyate tayoḥ / pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate // MMK_19.3 //

Moreover, if they are not dependent upon the past, neither would be found. Therefore, neither a present nor a future time is found.

[Summarizing the points so far, “Time is by definition an ordering of events in which moments stand in determinate relations to one another, in virtue of which the location of any moment depends on the location of all of the others. The present is the present only because it is poised within the past and the future. If it were not, it would not be the present. So either the present is in the past, in which case it is nonexistent, or it is independent of the past and the future, in which case it is nonexistent.” Garfield p. 256]

4. etenaivāvaśiṣṭau dvau krameṇa parivartakau / uttamādhamamadhyādīn ekatvādīṃś ca lakṣayet // MMK_19.4 //

In the same way, the remaining two periods [of time] and other concepts Such as highest, lowest, and the middle, and also identity should be characterized.

[Nāgārjuna is insisting that the same argument be applied to the concepts of the present in relation to the past and future, and to the future in relation to the past and present, as well as high, low, middle, and even the very concept of individuation (i.e. identity or unity, eka.]

5. nāsthito gṛhyate kālaḥ sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate / yo gṛhyetāgṛhītaś ca kālaḥ prajñapyate katham // MMK_19.5 //

A non-stationary time is not grasped. A stationary time is not found. Even if the ungraspable time were to be grasped, how can it be made known?

[Garfield: “To say that time is changing is incoherent; we would need to posit a super-time in which that change occurs.” And to say time is not changing, i.e. the past is a static entity, implies inherent self-existence.]

6. bhāvaṃ pratītya kālaś cet kālo bhāvād ṛte kutaḥ / na ca kaś cana bhāvo 'sti kutaḥ kālo bhaviṣyati // MMK_19.6 //

If time is dependent upon an existent (bhāva), how can there be time without an existent? If there were no existent entities at all, what would it be the time of?

CHAPTER TWENTY: Combination / Sāmagrī

1. hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi / phalamasti ca sāmagryāṃ sāmagryā jāyate katham // MMK_20.1 //

If the effect (hetu) were to arise from a combination of cause and conditions, and if it were to exist in the combination, how can it arise from the combination?

2. hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi / phalaṃ nāsti ca sāmagryāṃ sāmagryā jāyate katham // MMK_20.2 //

If the effect were to arise from a combination of cause and conditions and if it were not to exist in the combination, how can it arise from the combination?

3. hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryām asti cet phalam / gṛhyeta nanu sāmagryāṃ sāmagryāṃ ca na gṛhyate // MMK_20.3 //

If it is assumed that the effect exists in the combination of cause and conditions, should it not be grasped in the combination? However, it is not grasped in the combination.

4. hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryāṃ nāsti cet phalam / hetavaḥ pratyayāś ca syur ahetupratyayaiḥ samāḥ // MMK_20.4 //

5. hetuṃ phalasya dattvā ca yadi hetur nirudhyate / yad dattaṃ yan nirudhaṃ ca hetor ātmadvayaṃ bhavet // MMK_20.5 //

6. hetuṃ phalasyādattvā ca yadi hetur nirudhyate / hetau niruddhe jātaṃ tat phalam āhetukaṃ bhavet // MMK_20.6 //

7. phalaṃ sahaiva sāmagryā yadi prādurbhavet punaḥ / ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca janyate // MMK_20.7 //

8. pūrvam eva ca sāmagryāḥ phalaṃ prādurbhaved yadi / hetupratyayanirmuktaṃ phalam āhetukaṃ bhavet // MMK_20.8 //

9. niruddhe cet phalaṃ hetau hetoḥ saṃkramaṇaṃ bhavet / pūrvajātasya hetoś ca punarjanma prasajyate // MMK_20.9 //

janayet phalam utpannaṃ niruddho 'staṃgataḥ katham / hetus tiṣṭhann api kathaṃ phalena janayed vṛtaḥ // MMK_20.10 //

athāvṛtaḥ phalenāsau katamaj janayet phalam / na hy adṛṣṭvā na dṛṣṭvāpi hetur janayate phalam // MMK_20.11 //

nātītasya hy atītena phalasya saha hetunā / nājātena na jātena saṃgatir jātu vidyate // MMK_20.12 //

na jātasya hy ajātena phalasya saha hetunā / nātītena na jātena saṃgatir jātu vidyate // MMK_20.13 //

nājātasya hi jātena phalasya saha hetunā / nājātena na naṣṭena saṃgatir jātu vidyate // MMK_20.14 //

asatyāṃ saṃgatau hetuḥ kathaṃ janayate phalam / satyāṃ vā saṃgatau hetuḥ kathaṃ janayate phalam // MMK_20.15 //

hetuḥ phalena śūnyaś cet kathaṃ janayate phalam / hetuḥ phalenāśūnyaś cet kathaṃ janayate phalam // MMK_20.16 //

phalaṃ notpatsyate 'śūnyam aśūnyaṃ na nirotsyate / aniruddham anutpannam aśūnyaṃ tad bhaviṣyati // MMK_20.17 //

katham utpatsyate śūnyaṃ kathaṃ śūnyaṃ nirotsyate / śūnyam apy aniruddhaṃ tad anutpannaṃ prasajyate // MMK_20.18 //

hetoḥ phalasya caikatvaṃ na hi jātūpapadyate / hetoḥ phalasya cānyatvaṃ na hi jātūpapadyate // MMK_20.19 //

ekatve phalahetvoḥ syād aikyaṃ janakajanyayoḥ / pṛthaktve phalahetvoḥ syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā // MMK_20.20 //

phalaṃ svabhāvasadbhūtaṃ kiṃ hetur janayiṣyati / phalaṃ svabhāvāsadbhūtaṃ kiṃ hetur janayiṣyati // MMK_20.21 //

na cājanayamānasya hetutvam upapadyate / hetutvānupapattau ca phalaṃ kasya bhaviṣyati // MMK_20.22 //

na ca pratyayahetūnām iyam ātmānam ātmanā / yā sāmagrī janayate sā kathaṃ janayet phalam // MMK_20.23 //

na sāmagrīkṛtaṃ phalaṃ nāsāmagrīkṛtaṃ phalam / asti pratyayasāmagrī kuta eva phalaṃ vinā // MMK_20.24 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE:

vinā vā saha vā nāsti vibhavaḥ saṃbhavena vai / vinā vā saha vā nāsti saṃbhavo vibhavena vai // MMK_21.1 //

bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma vibhavaḥ saṃbhavaṃ vinā / vinaiva janma maraṇaṃ vibhavo nodbhavaṃ vinā // MMK_21.2 //

saṃbhavenaiva vibhavaḥ kathaṃ saha bhaviṣyati / na janma maraṇaṃ caivaṃ tulyakālaṃ hi vidyate // MMK_21.3 //

bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma saṃbhavo vibhavaṃ vinā / anityatā hi bhāveṣu na kadācin na vidyate // MMK_21.4 //

saṃbhavo vibhavenaiva kathaṃ saha bhaviṣyati / na janma maraṇaṃ caiva tulyakālaṃ hi vidyate // MMK_21.5 //

sahānyonyena vā siddhir vinānyonyena vā yayoḥ / na vidyate tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate // MMK_21.6 //

kṣayasya saṃbhavo nāsti nākṣayasyāsti saṃbhavaḥ / kṣayasya vibhavo nāsti vibhavo nākṣayasya ca // MMK_21.7 //

saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva vinā bhāvaṃ na vidyate / saṃbhavaṃ vibhavaṃ caiva vinā bhāvo na vidyate // MMK_21.8 //

saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva na śūnyasyopapadyate / saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva nāśūnyasyopapadyate // MMK_21.9 //

saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva naika ity upapadyate / saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva na nānety upapadyate // MMK_21.10 //

dṛśyate saṃbhavaścaiva vibhavaś caiva te bhavet / dṛśyate saṃbhavaścaiva mohād vibhava eva ca // MMK_21.11 //

na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate / nābhāvāj jāyate 'bhāvo 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate // MMK_21.12 //

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate / na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ // MMK_21.13 //

bhāvam abhyupapannasya śāśvatocchedadarśanam / prasajyate sa bhāvo hi nityo 'nityo 'tha vā bhavet // MMK_21.14 //

bhāvam abhyupapannasya naivocchedo na śāśvatam / udayavyayasaṃtānaḥ phalahetvor bhavaḥ sa hi // MMK_21.15 //

udayavyayasaṃtānaḥ phalahetvor bhavaḥ sa cet / vyayasyāpunarutpatter hetūcchedaḥ prasajyate // MMK_21.16 //

sadbhāvasya svabhāvena nāsadbhāvaś ca yujyate / nirvāṇakāle cocchedaḥ praśamād bhavasaṃtateḥ // MMK_21.17 //

carame na niruddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaḥ / carame nāniruddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaḥ // MMK_21.18 //

nirudhyamāne carame prathamo yadi jāyate / nirudhyamāna ekaḥ syāj jāyamāno 'paro bhavet // MMK_21.19 //

na cen nirudhyamānaś ca jāyamānaś ca yujyate / sārdhaṃ ca mriyate yeṣu teṣu skandheṣu jāyate // MMK_21.20 //

evaṃ triṣv api kāleṣu na yuktā bhavasaṃtatiḥ / triṣu kāleṣu yā nāsti sā kathaṃ bhavasaṃtatiḥ // MMK_21.21 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO:

skandhā na nānyaḥ skandhebhyo nāsmin skandhā na teṣu saḥ / tathāgataḥ skandhavān na katamo 'tra tathāgataḥ // MMK_22.1 //

buddhaḥ skandhān upādāya yadi nāsti svabhāvataḥ / svabhāvataś ca yo nāsti kutaḥ sa parabhāvataḥ // MMK_22.2 //

pratītya parabhāvaṃ yaḥ so 'nātmety upapadyate / yaś cānātmā sa ca kathaṃ bhaviṣyati tathāgataḥ // MMK_22.3 //

yadi nāsti svabhāvaś ca parabhāvaḥ kathaṃ bhavet / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte kaḥ sa tathāgataḥ // MMK_22.4 //

skandhān yady anupādāya bhavet kaścit tathāgataḥ / sa idānīm upādadyād upādāya tato bhavet // MMK_22.5 //

skandhāṃś cāpy anupādāya nāsti kaścit tathāgataḥ / yaś ca nāsty anupādāya sa upādāsyate katham // MMK_22.6 //

na bhavaty anupādattam upādānaṃ ca kiṃ cana / na cāsti nirupādānaḥ kathaṃ cana tathāgataḥ // MMK_22.7 //

tattvānyatvena yo nāsti mṛgyamāṇaś ca pañcadhā / upādānena sa kathaṃ prajñapyate tathāgataḥ // MMK_22.8 //

yad apīdam upādānaṃ tat svabhāvān na vidyate / svabhāvataś ca yan nāsti kutas tat parabhāvataḥ // MMK_22.9 //

evaṃ śūnyam upādānam upādātā ca sarvaśaḥ / prajñapyate ca śūnyena kathaṃ śūnyas tathāgataḥ // MMK_22.10 //

śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet / ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti prajñaptyarthaṃ tu kathyate // MMK_22.11 //

śāśvatāśāśvatādy atra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam / antānantādi cāpy atra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam // MMK_22.12 //

ghanagrāho gṛhītas tu yenāstīti tathāgataḥ / nāstīti sa vikalpayan nirvṛtasyāpi kalpayet // MMK_22.13 //

svabhāvataś ca śūnye 'smiṃś cintā naivopapadyate / paraṃ nirodhād bhavati buddho na bhavatīti vā // MMK_22.14 //

prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam / te prapañcahatāḥ sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam // MMK_22.15 //

tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tatsvabhāvam idaṃ jagat / tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idaṃ jagat // MMK_22.16 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE:

saṃkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate / śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya hi // MMK_23.1 //

śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya ye / te svabhāvān na vidyante tasmāt kleśā na tattvataḥ // MMK_23.2 //

ātmano 'stitvanāstitve na kathaṃ cic ca sidhyataḥ / taṃ vināstitvanāstitve kleśānāṃ sidhyataḥ katham // MMK_23.3 //

kasya cid dhi bhavantīme kleśāḥ sa ca na sidhyati / kaścid āho vinā kaṃcit santi kleśā na kasyacit // MMK_23.4 //

svakāyadṛṣṭivat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā / svakāyadṛṣṭivat kliṣṭaṃ kleśeṣv api na pañcadhā // MMK_23.5 //

svabhāvato na vidyante śubhāśubhaviparyayāḥ / pratītya katamān kleśāḥ śubhāśubhaviparyayān // MMK_23.6 //

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca ṣaḍvidham / vastu rāgasya doṣasya mohasya ca vikalpyate // MMK_23.7 //

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca kevalāḥ / gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ // MMK_23.8 //

aśubhaṃ vā śubhaṃ vāpi kutas teṣu bhaviṣyati / māyāpuruṣakalpeṣu pratibimbasameṣu ca // MMK_23.9 //

anapekṣya śubhaṃ nāsty aśubhaṃ prajñapayemahi / yat pratītya śubhaṃ tasmāc chubhaṃ naivopapadyate // MMK_23.10 //

anapekṣyāśubhaṃ nāsti śubhaṃ prajñapayemahi / yat pratītyāśubhaṃ tasmād aśubhaṃ naiva vidyate // MMK_23.11 //

avidyamāne ca śubhe kuto rāgo bhaviṣyati / aśubhe 'vidyamāne ca kuto dveṣo bhaviṣyati // MMK_23.12 //

anitye nityam ity evaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ / nānityaṃ vidyate śūnye kuto grāho viparyayaḥ // MMK_23.13 //

anitye nityam ity evaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ / anityam ity api grāhaḥ śūnye kiṃ na viparyayaḥ // MMK_23.14 //

yena gṛhṇāti yo grāho grahītā yac ca gṛhyate / upaśāntāni sarvāṇi tasmād grāho na vidyate // MMK_23.15 //

avidyamāne grāhe ca mithyā vā samyag eva vā / bhaved viparyayaḥ kasya bhavet kasyāviparyayaḥ // MMK_23.16 //

na cāpi viparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ / na cāpy aviparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ // MMK_23.17 //

na viparyasyamānasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ / vimṛśasva svayaṃ kasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ // MMK_23.18 //

anutpannāḥ kathaṃ nāma bhaviṣyanti viparyayāḥ / viparyayeṣv ajāteṣu viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ // MMK_23.19 //

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate / na svataḥ parataś ceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ // MMK_23.20 //

ātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca yadi vidyate / ātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca na viparyayaḥ // MMK_23.21 //

nātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca yadi vidyate / anātmā 'śucy anityaṃ ca naiva duḥkhaṃ ca vidyate // MMK_23.22 //

evaṃ nirudhyate 'vidyā viparyayanirodhanāt / avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārādyaṃ nirudhyate // MMK_23.23 //

yadi bhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ kecid dhi kasyacit / kathaṃ nāma prahīyeran kaḥ svabhāvaṃ prahāsyati // MMK_23.24 //

yady abhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ kecid dhi kasyacit / kathaṃ nāma prahīyeran ko 'sadbhāvaṃ prahāsyati // MMK_23.25 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR:

yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ / caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvas te prasajyate // MMK_24.1 //

parijñā ca prahāṇaṃ ca bhāvanā sākṣikarma ca / caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvān nopapadyate // MMK_24.2 //

tadabhāvān na vidyante catvāry āryaphalāni ca / phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakāḥ // MMK_24.3 //

saṃgho nāsti na cet santi te 'ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ / abhāvāc cāryasatyānāṃ saddharmo 'pi na vidyate // MMK_24.4 //

dharme cāsati saṃghe ca kathaṃ buddho bhaviṣyati / evaṃ trīṇy api ratnāni bruvāṇaḥ pratibādhase // MMK_24.5 //

śūnyatāṃ phalasadbhāvam adharmaṃ dharmam eva ca / sarvasaṃvyavahārāṃś ca laukikān pratibādhase // MMK_24.6 //

atra brūmaḥ śūnyatāyāṃ na tvaṃ vetsi prayojanam / śūnyatāṃ śūnyatārthaṃ ca tata evaṃ vihanyase // MMK_24.7 //

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā / lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ // MMK_24.8 //

ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ / te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane // MMK_24.9 //

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate / paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate // MMK_24.10 //

vināśayati durdṛṣtā śūnyatā mandamedhasam / sarpo yathā durgṛhīto vidyā vā duṣprasādhitā // MMK_24.11 //

ataś ca pratyudāvṛttaṃ cittaṃ deśayituṃ muneḥ / dharmaṃ matvāsya dharmasya mandair duravagāhatām // MMK_24.12 //

śūnyatāyām adhilayaṃ yaṃ punaḥ kurute bhavān / doṣaprasaṅgo nāsmākaṃ sa śūnye nopapadyate // MMK_24.13 //

sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate / sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate // MMK_24.14 //

sa tvaṃ doṣān ātmanīyān asmāsu paripātayan / aśvam evābhirūḍhaḥ sann aśvam evāsi vismṛtaḥ // MMK_24.15 //

svabhāvād yadi bhāvānāṃ sadbhāvam anupaśyasi / ahetupratyayān bhāvāṃs tvam evaṃ sati paśyasi // MMK_24.16 //

kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva kartāraṃ karaṇaṃ kriyām / utpādaṃ ca nirodhaṃ ca phalaṃ ca pratibādhase // MMK_24.17 //

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā // MMK_24.18 //

apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate / yasmāt tasmād aśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate // MMK_24.19 //

yady aśūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ / caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvas te prasajyate // MMK_24.20 //

apratītya samutpannaṃ kuto duḥkhaṃ bhaviṣyati / anityam uktaṃ duḥkhaṃ hi tat svābhāvye na vidyate // MMK_24.21 //

svabhāvato vidyamānaṃ kiṃ punaḥ samudeṣyate / tasmāt samudayo nāsti śūnyatāṃ pratibādhataḥ // MMK_24.22 //

na nirodhaḥ svabhāvena sato duḥkhasya vidyate / svabhāvaparyavasthānān nirodhaṃ pratibādhase // MMK_24.23 //

svābhāvye sati mārgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate / athāsau bhāvyate mārgaḥ svābhāvyaṃ te na vidyate // MMK_24.24 //

yadā duḥkhaṃ samudayo nirodhaś ca na vidyate / mārgo duḥkhanirodhatvāt katamaḥ prāpayiṣyati // MMK_24.25 //

svabhāvenāparijñānaṃ yadi tasya punaḥ katham / parijñānaṃ nanu kila svabhāvaḥ samavasthitaḥ // MMK_24.26 //

prahāṇasākṣātkaraṇe bhāvanā caivam eva te / parijñāvan na yujyante catvāry api phalāni ca // MMK_24.27 //

svabhāvenānadhigataṃ yat phalaṃ tat punaḥ katham / śakyaṃ samadhigantuṃ syāt svabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇataḥ // MMK_24.28 //

phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakāḥ / saṃgho nāsti na cet santi te 'ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ // MMK_24.29 //

abhāvāc cāryasatyānāṃ saddharmo 'pi na vidyate / dharme cāsati saṃghe ca kathaṃ buddho bhaviṣyati // MMK_24.30 //

apratītyāpi bodhiṃ ca tava buddhaḥ prasajyate / apratītyāpi buddhaṃ ca tava bodhiḥ prasajyate // MMK_24.31 //

yaś cābuddhaḥ svabhāvena sa bodhāya ghaṭann api / na bodhisattvacaryāyāṃ bodhiṃ te 'dhigamiṣyati // MMK_24.32 //

na ca dharmam adharmaṃ vā kaścij jātu kariṣyati / kim aṣūnyasya kartavyaṃ svabhāvaḥ kriyate na hi // MMK_24.33 //

vinā dharmam adharmaṃ ca phalaṃ hi tava vidyate / dharmādharmanimittaṃ ca phalaṃ tava na vidyate // MMK_24.34 //

dharmādharmanimittaṃ vā yadi te vidyate phalam / dharmādharmasamutpannam aśūnyaṃ te kathaṃ phalam // MMK_24.35 //

sarvasaṃvyvahārāṃś ca laukikān pratibādhase / yat pratītyasamutpādaśūnyatāṃ pratibādhase // MMK_24.36 //

na kartavyaṃ bhavet kiṃcid anārabdhā bhavet kriyā / kārakaḥ syād akurvāṇaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratibādhataḥ // MMK_24.37 //

ajātam aniruddhaṃ ca kūṭaśthaṃ ca bhaviṣyati / vicitrābhir avasthābhiḥ svabhāve rahitaṃ jagat // MMK_24.38 //

asaṃprāptasya ca prāptir duḥkhaparyantakarma ca / sarvakleśaprahāṇaṃ ca yady aśūnyaṃ na vidyate // MMK_24.39 //

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyatīdaṃ sa paśyati / duḥkhaṃ samudayaṃ caiva nirodhaṃ mārgam eva ca // MMK_24.40 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE:

yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ / prahāṇād vā nirodhād vā kasya nirvāṇam iṣyate // MMK_25.1 //

yady aśūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ / prahāṇād vā nirodhād vā kasya nirvāṇam iṣyate // MMK_25.2 //

aprahīṇam asaṃprāptam anucchinnam aśāśvatam / aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvāṇam ucyate // MMK_25.3 //

bhāvas tāvan na nirvāṇaṃ jarāmaraṇalakṣaṇam / prasajyetāsti bhāvo hi na jarāmaraṇaṃ vinā // MMK_25.4 //

bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ bhavet / nāsaṃskṛto hi vidyate bhāvaḥ kva cana kaś cana // MMK_25.5 //

bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇam anupādāya tat katham / nirvāṇaṃ nānupādāya kaścid bhāvo hi vidyate // MMK_25.6 //

bhāvo yadi na nirvāṇam abhāvaḥ kiṃ bhaviṣyati / nirvāṇaṃ yatra bhāvo na nābhāvas tatra vidyate // MMK_25.7 //

yady abhāvaś ca nirvāṇam anupādāya tat katham / nirvāṇaṃ na hy abhāvo 'sti yo 'nupādāya vidyate // MMK_25.8 //

ya ājavaṃjavībhāva upādāya pratītya vā / so 'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate // MMK_25.9 //

prahāṇaṃ cābravīc chāstā bhavasya vibhavasya ca / tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo nirvāṇam iti yujyate // MMK_25.10 //

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṃ yadi / bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca mokṣas tac ca na yujyate // MMK_25.11 //

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṃ yadi / nānupādāya nirvāṇam upādāyobhayaṃ hi tat // MMK_25.12 //

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṃ katham / asaṃskṛtaṃ hi nirvāṇaṃ bhāvābhāvau ca saṃskṛtau // MMK_25.13 //

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇa ubhayaṃ katham / tayor abhāvo hy ekatra prakāśatamasor iva // MMK_25.14 //

naivābhāvo naiva bhāvo nirvāṇam iti yā 'ñjanā / abhāve caiva bhāve ca sā siddhe sati sidhyati // MMK_25.15 //

naivābhāvo naiva bhāvo nirvāṇaṃ yadi vidyate / naivābhāvo naiva bhāva iti kena tad ajyate // MMK_25.16 //

paraṃ nirodhād bhagavān bhavatīty eva nājyate / na bhavaty ubhayaṃ ceti nobhayaṃ ceti nājyate // MMK_25.17 //

tiṣṭhamāno 'pi bhagavān bhavatīty eva nājyate / na bhavaty ubhayaṃ ceti nobhayaṃ ceti nājyate // MMK_25.18 //

na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam / na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam // MMK_25.19 //

nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca / na tayor antaraṃ kiṃcit susūkṣmam api vidyate // MMK_25.20 //

paraṃ nirodhād antādyāḥ śāśvatādyāś ca dṛṣṭayaḥ / nirvāṇam aparāntaṃ ca pūrvāntaṃ ca samāśritāḥ // MMK_25.21 //

śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu kim anantaṃ kim antavat / kim anantam antavac ca nānantaṃ nāntavac ca kim // MMK_25.22 //

kiṃ tad eva kim anyat kiṃ śāśvataṃ kim aśāśvatam / aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca kiṃ vā nobhayam apy atha // MMK_25.23 //

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ / na kva cit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ // MMK_25.24 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX:

punarbhavāya saṃskārān avidyānivṛtas tridhā / abhisaṃskurute yāṃs tair gatiṃ gacchati karmabhiḥ // MMK_26.1 //

vijñānaṃ saṃniviśate saṃskārapratyayaṃ gatau / saṃniviṣṭe 'tha vijñāne nāmarūpaṃ niṣicyate // MMK_26.2 //

niṣikte nāmarūpe tu ṣaḍāyatanasaṃbhavaḥ / ṣaḍāyatanam āgamya saṃsparśaḥ saṃpravartate // MMK_26.3 //

cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca samanvāhāram eva ca / nāmarūpaṃ pratītyaivaṃ vijñānaṃ saṃpravartate // MMK_26.4 //

saṃnipātas trayāṇāṃ yo rūpavijñānacakṣuṣām / sparśaḥ sa tasmāt sparśāc ca vedanā saṃpravartate // MMK_26.5 //

vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā vedanārthaṃ hi tṛṣyate / tṛṣyamāṇa upādānam upādatte caturvidham // MMK_26.6 //

upādāne sati bhava upādātuḥ pravartate / syād dhi yady anupādāno mucyeta na bhaved bhavaḥ // MMK_26.7 //

pañca skandhāḥ sa ca bhavo bhavāj jātiḥ pravartate / jarāmaraṇaduḥkhādi śokāḥ saparidevanāḥ // MMK_26.8 //

daurmanasyam upāyāsā jāter etat pravartate / kevalasyaivam etasya duḥkhaskandhasya saṃbhavaḥ // MMK_26.9 //

saṃsāramūlaṃ saṃskārān avidvān saṃskaroty ataḥ / avidvān kārakas tasmān na vidvāṃs tattvadarśanāt // MMK_26.10 //

avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārāṇām asaṃbhavaḥ / avidyāyā nirodhas tu jñānasyāsyaiva bhāvanāt // MMK_26.11 //

tasya tasya nirodhena tat tan nābhipravartate / duḥkhaskandhaḥ kevalo 'yam evaṃ samyag nirudhyate // MMK_26.12 //

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN:

abhūm atītam adhvānaṃ nābhūvam iti dṛṣṭayaḥ / yās tāḥ śāśvatalokādyāḥ pūrvāntaṃ samupāśritāḥ // MMK_27.1 //

dṛṣṭayo na bhaviṣyāmi kim anyo 'nāgate 'dhvani / bhaviṣyāmīti cāntādyā aparāntaṃ samāśritāḥ // MMK_27.2 //

abhūm atītam adhvānam ity etan nopapadyate / yo hi janmasu pūrveṣu sa eva na bhavaty ayam // MMK_27.3 //

sa evātmeti tu bhaved upādānaṃ viśiṣyate / upādānavinirmukta ātmā te katamaḥ punaḥ // MMK_27.4 //

upādānavinirmukto nāsty ātmeti kṛte sati / syād upādānam evātmā nāsti cātmeti vaḥ punaḥ // MMK_27.5 //

na copādānam evātmā vyeti tat samudeti ca / kathaṃ hi nāmopādānam upādātā bhaviṣyati // MMK_27.6 //

anyaḥ punar upādānād ātmā naivopapadyate / gṛhyeta hy anupādāno yady anyo na ca gṛhyate // MMK_27.7 //

evaṃ nānya upādānān na copādānam eva saḥ / ātmā nāsty anupādāno nāpi nāsty eṣa niścayaḥ // MMK_27.8 //

nābhūm atītam adhvānam ity etan nopapadyate / yo hi janmasu pūrveṣu tato 'nyo na bhavaty ayam // MMK_27.9 //

yadi hy ayaṃ bhaved anyaḥ pratyākhyāyāpi taṃ bhavet / tathaiva ca sa saṃtiṣṭhet tatra jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ // MMK_27.10 //

ucchedaḥ karmaṇāṃ nāśaḥ kṛtam anyena karma ca / pratisaṃvedayed anya evam ādi prasajyate // MMK_27.11 //

nāpy abhūtvā samudbhūto doṣo hy atra prasajyate / kṛtako vā bhaved ātmā saṃbhūto vāpy ahetukaḥ // MMK_27.12 //

evaṃ dṛṣtir atīte yā nābhūm aham abhūm aham / ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti naiṣā samupapadyate // MMK_27.13 //

adhvany anāgate kiṃ nu bhaviṣyāmīti darśanam / na bhaviṣyāmi cety etad atītenādhvanā samam // MMK_27.14 //

sa devaḥ sa manuṣyaś ced evaṃ bhavati śāśvatam / anutpannaś ca devaḥ syāj jāyate na hi śāśvatam // MMK_27.15 //

devād anyo manuṣyaś ced aśāśvatam ato bhavet / devād anyo manuṣyaś cet saṃtatir nopapadyate // MMK_27.16 //

divyo yady ekadeśaḥ syād ekdeśaś ca mānuṣaḥ / aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca bhavet tac ca na yujyate // MMK_27.17 //

aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca prasiddham ubhayaṃ yadi / siddhe na śāśvataṃ kāmaṃ naivāśāśvatam ity api // MMK_27.18 //

kutaścid āgataḥ kaścit kiṃcid gacchet punaḥ kva cit / yadi tasmād anādis tu saṃsāraḥ syān na cāsti saḥ // MMK_27.19 //

nāsti cec chāśvataḥ kaścit ko bhaviṣyaty aśāśvataḥ / śāśvato 'śāśvataś cāpi dvābhyām ābhyāṃ tiraskṛtaḥ // MMK_27.20 //

antavān yadi lokaḥ syāt paralokaḥ kathaṃ bhavet / athāpy anantavāl lokaḥ paralokaḥ kathaṃ bhavet // MMK_27.21 //

skandhānām eṣa saṃtāno yasmād dīpārciṣām iva / tasmān nānantavattvaṃ ca nāntavattvaṃ ca yujyate // MMK_27.22 //

pūrve yadi ca bhajyerann utpadyeran na cāpy amī / skandhāḥ skandhān pratītyemān atha loko 'ntavān bhavet // MMK_27.23 //

pūrve yadi na bhajyerann utpadyeran na cāpyamī / skandhāḥ skandhān pratītyemāl loko 'nanto bhaved atha // MMK_27.24 //

antavān ekadeśaś ced ekadeśas tv anantavān / syād antavān anantaś ca lokas tac ca na yujyate // MMK_27.25 //

kathaṃ tāvad upādātur ekadeśo vinaṅkṣyate / na naṅkṣyate caikadeśa evaṃ caitan na yujyate // MMK_27.26 //

upādānaikadeśaś ca kathaṃ nāma vinaṅkṣyate / na naṅkṣyate caikadeśo naitad apy upapadyate // MMK_27.27 //

antavac cāpy anantaṃ ca prasiddham ubhayaṃ yadi / siddhe naivāntavat kāmaṃ naivānantavad ity api // MMK_27.28 //

atha vā sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāc chāśvatādayaḥ / kva kasya katamāḥ kasmāt saṃbhaviṣyanti dṛṣṭayaḥ // MMK_27.29 //

sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat / anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam // MMK_27.30 //