唯識二十論
世親菩薩造
大唐三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
Translated from the Chinese version of Xuanzang July 3, 661 Yü Hua Monastery
T.31.1590 [Nos. 1588, 1589; cf. No. 1591]
安立大乘三界唯識，以契經說三界唯心，心、意、識、了，名之差別。此中說心，意兼心所，唯遮外境，不遣相應，內識生時似外境現，如有眩瞖見髮蠅等，此中都無少分實義。即於此義，有設難言。頌曰：
“The three realms are consciousness only” of the Mahayana is established through the scriptural expression, “the three realms are mind only.” “Mind,” “thought,” “consciousness,” and “perception” (vijnapti) are different names. Here, “mind” and “thought” are lumped together with mental ctivities (caitta). “Only” excludes objects of perception (artha) that are external [to consciousness], not associates [of consciousness]. When internal consciousness is born, it appears resembling external objects of perception, [but] in the same way that one with diseased eyesight sees [nonexistent] hairs, flies, etc. Here there is not the slightest aspect of reality. Regarding this concept, there are some doubts. A verse says:
若識無實境， 則處時決定， 相續不決定， 作用不應成。
If consciousness is without real objects of perception, The restriction (niyama) of place and time, The nonrestriction of mental continuity (saṃtāna), And function would not be established.
論曰：此說何義？若離識實有色等外法，色等識生不緣色等，何因此識有處得生，非一切處？何故此處有時識起，非一切時？同一處時有多相續，何不決定隨一識生？如眩瞖人見髮蠅等，非無眩瞖有此識生。復有何[13]因，諸眩瞖者所見髮等無髮[14]等用，夢中所得飲食、刀杖、毒藥、衣等無飲等用，尋香城等無城等用。餘髮等物其用非無，若實同無色等外境，唯有內識似外境生，定處、定時、不定相續、有作用物皆不應成。非皆不成。頌曰：
The Treatise asks, what does this mean? If you reject [the idea that] consciousness really has external dharmas such as form, and [that] consciousness of form, etc., arises conditioned by [external] form, etc., why does this consciousness arise in some places but not in all places? Why does consciousness [of form, etc.,] occur in one place at one time but not at all times? When there are many mental continuities in the same single place at one time, why is [consciousness of form] not born restricted according to [just] one consciousness, just as one with diseased eyesight sees hairs, flies, etc., but this consciousness is not born in someone without the disease? Again, [asks the realist,] why are the [imaginary] hairs, etc., seen by those with eye disease lacking in the function of [real] hair, etc.? Food, drink, swords, cudgels, poison, medicines, clothes, etc., in a dream are devoid of the function of food, etc. The Gandharva city etc., is devoid of the function of a [real] city, etc., but the function of other things such as [re al] hair is not nonexistent. If [dreams and waking] are really the same, without external objects of perception such as form, and there is only internal consciousness that is born resembling an external objective realm, the restriction (niyati) of place and time, nonrestriction of mental continuities, and the functioning of things would not be demonstrated. [We reply,] they are not all not demonstrated. A verse says:
處時定如夢， 身不定如鬼， 同見膿河等， 如夢損有用。
Time and place are restricted as in dreams. The body is not restricted, just as [hungry] ghosts (preta) All alike see pus rivers, etc., And just as in dreams loss [of semen] has a function.
論曰：如夢意說如夢所見，謂如夢中雖無實境，而或有處見有村園男女等物，非一切處。即於是處，或時見有彼村園等，非一切時。由此雖無離識實境，而處時定非不得成。說如鬼言，顯如餓鬼。河中膿滿故名膿河，如說酥瓶其中[＊]酥滿。謂如餓鬼同業異熟，多身共集皆見膿河，非於此中定唯一見。等言顯示或見糞等，及見有情執持刀杖遮捍守護不令得食。由此雖無離識實境，而多相續不定義成。又如夢中境雖無實，而有損失精血等用。由此雖無離識實境，而有虛妄作用義成。如是且依別別譬喻，顯處定等四義得成。復次頌曰：
The Treatise says, the meaning of “as in dreams” is that it is like what is seen in dreams. That is, just as in a dream there are no real objects of perception and still in one place one can see a village, garden, men and women, etc., but not in all places, and at this place at a certain time one can see a village, garden, etc., but not at all times. Consequently, although there are no real objects of perception external to consciousness, restriction of time and place are not undemonstrable. The Treatise says, “as ghosts” means “hungry ghosts” (preta). The rivers [they see] are filled with pus and are therefore called “pus rivers, ” in the same way one speaks of a pot filled with ghee as a “ghee pot.” This means that just as through the maturation of the same actions {karma) the many bodies of hungry ghosts collect together [in the nether world] and all see the pus rivers, it is not that in this [situation] it is restricted so only one sees it. The word “etc.” means that they also may see excrement, etc., and sentient beings grasping swords and cudgels, defending and guarding food and not allowing [the hungry ghosts] to get food. Consequently, even though there are no real objects of perception apart from consciousness, still the nonrestriction of many mental continuities is demonstrated. Also, just as in a dream the objects of perception are devoid of reality, yet there is a function for such things as loss of semen, etc., as a result of this, although there are no real objects of perception apart from consciousness, still, the concept of a function that is false [in a waking state] is demonstrated. Thus by using different similes, the four concepts such as restriction of place are demonstrated. Again, the next verse says:
一切如地獄， 同見獄卒等， 能為逼害事， 故四義皆成。
All [four concepts] are like [beings in] hell Who alike see infernal guardians, etc., And are made to be injured. Therefore the four concepts are all demonstrated
論曰：應知此中一地獄喻，顯處定等一切皆成。如地獄言，顯在地獄受逼害苦諸有情類。謂地獄中雖無真實有情數攝獄卒等事，而彼有情同業異熟增上力故，同處同時眾多相續，皆共見有獄卒、狗、烏、鐵山物等來至其所為逼害事。由此雖無離識實境，而處定等四義皆成。何緣不許獄卒等類是實有情？不應理故。且此不應那落迦攝，不受如彼所受苦故。互相逼害，應不可立彼那落迦。此獄卒等形量力既等，應不極相怖，應自不能忍受鐵地炎熱猛焰恒燒然苦，云何於彼能逼害他？非那落迦不應生彼，如何天上現有傍生，地獄亦然，有傍生鬼為獄卒等。此救不然。頌曰：
The Treatise says, you should know that here, the single example of hell shows that restrictions of place, etc., are all demonstrated. The words “like hell” refer to various kinds of sentient beings who reside in hell and experience injury and suffering. That is, even though in hell there are no real sentient beings that include such things as infernal guardians, still, because of the dominant power of the maturation of identical acts of those sentient beings, many [individual] mental continuities (samtâna) in the same place, at the same time, all alike see infernal guardians, dogs, crows, iron mountains, etc., coming to them to inflict injury. As a result of this [example,] even though there are no real objects of perception apart from consciousness, still, the four concepts of restriction of place, etc., are demonstrated. [The opponent asks,] why not admit that species such as infernal guardians are real sentient beings? [We respond,] because it does not correspond to reason. Now, these [guardians] should not be included with [beings in] naraka (hell), because they do not experience suffering in the way the others experience it, and if they [i.e., guardians and those being tormented] harm each other, then you cannot establish some as beings suffering in naraka and others as infernal guardians. Since all are alike in size, shape, and power, they would not fear each other very much. They themselves [the infernal guardians] would not be able to bear the suffering of the constant burning of the fierce fires of iron earth, etc., so how would they be able to inflict injury on others? If they are not infernal beings, they ought not to be born there. [Objection:] How do animals appear in the celestial realm? It is the same with naraka. Animals, ghosts, etc., act as infernal guardians, etc. [We reply,] this remedy [to your argument] is unsuitable. A verse says:
如天上傍生， 地獄中不爾， 所執傍生鬼， 不受彼苦故。
What is true of animals in the celestial realm Is not true for those [beings in the] hells, Because the animals and ghosts you assert Do not experience that suffering.
論曰：諸有傍生生天上者，必有能感彼器樂業，生彼定受器所生樂，非獄卒等受地獄中器所生苦，故不應許傍生鬼趣生[1]那落迦。若爾，應許彼那落迦業增上力生異大種，起勝形顯量力差別，於彼施設獄卒等名，為生彼怖，變現種種動手足等差別作用，如羝羊山乍離乍合、剛鐵林刺或低或昂。非事全無，然不應理。頌曰：
The Treatise says that with regard to animals being born in the celestial realm, they must have [past] karma that enables them to experience the happiness of that world (bhājana), and being born in that world, they definitely experience the happiness born of that world. The infernal guardians, etc., do not experience the suffering in hell that is born of that world. Therefore we should not admit that those with the destinations igati) of animals or ghosts are born in naraka. [Objection:] If that is so, then you must admit that the dominant (adhipati) power of karma of [beings born in] naraka produces unusual great elements (mahabhuta) that give rise to special shapes that display different sizes and power and upon whom we bestow such names as “infernal guardian.” In order to generate fear in those [reborn in hell,] they have different functions such as changing and appearing in various ways and moving their hands and feet, etc., like mountains that look like rams suddenly coming together [butting horns] and separating, or like thorns in the iron forest drooping down or lifting up [to impale the unfortunate sufferer]. [We reply,] it is not that these events are totally nonexistent; however, [your argument] does not correspond to reason. A verse says:
若許由業力， 有異大種生， 起如是轉變， 於識何不許？
If you admit that as a result of the power of karma Unusual great elements are born And they produce such changes, Why not admit [that they occur] in consciousness?
論曰：何緣不許識由業力如是轉變，而執大種？復次頌曰：
The Treatise asks, why do you not admit that consciousness, as a result of the power of action (karma), transforms like this, yet assert great elements? Again, the next verse says:
業熏習餘處， 執餘處有果， 所熏識有果， 不許有何因？
Perfuming (vāsanā) of karma is in one place, And you assert that the result exists elsewhere. That the result exists in the perfumed consciousness You do not admit; why is that?
論曰：執那落迦由自業力生差別大種起形等轉變，彼業熏習理應許在識相續中，不在餘處有熏習識，汝便不許有果轉變，無熏習處翻執有果，此有何因？有教為因，謂若唯識似色等現無別色等，佛不應說有色等處。此教非因，有別意故。頌曰：
The Treatise says, you assert that [beings in] naraka (hell) produce special great elements born of the power of their own action and give rise to changes of shapes, etc. The perfuming of their action must logically be admitted as being in their [individual] continuities of consciousness (vijñāna-saṃtāna) and nowhere else. There is a perfumed consciousness, but then you will not admit that there is a transformation of the result. Where there is no perfumed place, you turn around and assert that the result exists. Why is this? [The opponent replies,] scripture is the reason. That is, if there is only consciousness that appears resembling form, etc., where there is no form, etc., the Buddha would not have spoken of the sense bases (āyatana) of form, etc. [We reply,] this teaching is no reason [for your position,] because it has a special meaning. A verse says:
依彼所化生， 世尊密意趣， 說有色等處， 如化生有情。
For those beings to be instructed (vineya), The World-Honored One, with a hidden motive, Spoke of the existence of the sense bases (āyatana) of form, etc. In the same way [he spoke of] beings born spontaneously (upapāduka).
論曰：如佛說有化生有情，彼[2]但依心相續不斷能往後世密意趣說，不說實有化生有情。說無有情我，但有法因，故說色等處。契經亦爾，依所化生宜受彼教，密意趣說，非別[3]實有。依何密意說色等十？頌曰：
The Treatise says, this is just like the Buddha speaking of the existence of sentient beings who are born spontaneously. It was said only with a hidden motive regarding the noncessation of mental continuity and its ability to continue on into a subsequent time. He did not say that there are really existent beings who are born spontaneously, because he said, “There are no sentient beings or selves, only dharmas and their causes. ” It is the same when the scriptures speak of the sense bases of form, etc. [The Buddha] spoke with a hidden motive of there being no separate real existence [of sense bases] for those beings to be instructed who are fit to receive that teaching. [The opponent asks,] what is the hidden motive for speaking of the ten [bases] of form, etc.? [We reply,] a verse says:
識從自種生， 似境相而轉， 為成內外處， 佛說彼為十。
Consciousness is born from its own seeds And transforms to resemble characteristics of objects of perception. In order to establish internal and external sense bases, The Buddha spoke of them as being ten.
論曰：此說何義？似色現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生，佛依彼種及所現色，如次說為眼處色處。如是乃至似觸現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生，佛依彼種及所現觸，如次說為身處觸處。依斯密意，說色等十。此密意說有何勝利？頌曰：
The Treatise asks, what does this mean? [Answer:] Consciousness appearing resembling form is born from its own seeds as a special transformation [of the mental continuity] and the confluence of conditions [consisting of the apparent form and the perceiving aspect of consciousness]. On the basis of this seed and the appearing form, the Buddha spoke of [the seed and the appearing form as] sense bases consisting of eyes and sense bases consisting of form, respectively. In this way, finally, [after skipping over sense bases of sound, smells, and tastes, we come to where] consciousness resembling something tangible is born from its own seeds as a special transformation [of the mental continuity] and the confluence of conditions [consisting of the apparent tangible object and the perceiving aspect of consciousness]. On the basis of this seed and the appearing tangible object, the Buddha spoke of them respectively as the sense base consisting of the body and the sense base consisting of tangible objects. With this hidden motive, he spoke of the ten [sense bases] of form, etc. [Question:] What is the special value of this hidden motive? [Reply:] A verse says:
依此教能入， 數取趣無我， 所執法無我， 復依餘教入。
On the basis of this teaching one can enter The [teaching of the] absence of self (anātman) of the person (pudgala). Later, through other teachings, one enters The [teaching of the] absence of self of the dharmas that are asserted.
論曰：依此所說十二處教，受化者能入數取趣無我。謂若了知從六二法有六識轉，都無見者乃至知者，應受有情無我教者便能悟入有情無我。復依此餘說唯識教，受化者能入所執法無我。謂若了知唯識現似色等法起，此中都無色等相法，應受諸法無我教者便能悟入諸法無我。若知諸法一切種無入法無我，是則唯識亦畢竟無，何所安立？非知諸法一切種無乃得名為入法無我，然達愚夫遍計所執自性差別諸法無我，如是乃名入法無我，非諸佛境離言法性亦都無故名法無我。餘識所執此唯識性其體亦無，名法無我。不爾，餘識所執境有，則唯識理應不得成，許諸餘識有實境故。由此道理，說立唯識教，普令悟入一切法無我，非一切種撥有性故。復云何知佛依如是密意趣說有色等處，非別實有色等外法為色等識各別境耶？頌曰：
The Treatise says, on the basis of this teaching of the twelve sense bases that are discussed, one who receives instruction is able to enter [and grasp] the absence of a self in the pudgala (person). That is, if one thoroughly understands that the six consciousnesses [i.e., the five sense consciousnesses of sight, etc., plus mental consciousness] develop from the six pair of dharmas [i.e., the twelve sense bases] and that there is no perceiver or knower at all, then that person who should receive the teaching of the absence of self in the sentient will be able to awaken to and enter the [teaching of the] absence of self in the sentient. “Later, through other teachings, ” means the teaching of consciousness only. The one who receives instruction is able to enter the absence of a self in the asserted dharmas. That is, if one thoroughly understands the arising of dharmas that resemble form, etc., as the appearance of consciousness only, and that among these there are not any dharmas with characteristics such as form, the person who should receive the teaching of the absence of a self in dharmas will be able to awaken to and enter [the teaching of] the absence of a self in all dharmas. [Question:] If one understands the nonexistence of the entirety (sarvathā) of dharmas and enters the absence of a self in all dharmas, then consciousness only is [also, by implication,] ultimately nonexistent, so how can it be established? [Reply:] It is not by means of realizing the nonexistence of the entirety of dharmas that we speak of entering the absence of self of [all] dharmas. However, when the absence of self of the dharmas of self-nature (svabhāva) and difference (viśeṣa) that are imagined by the ignorant are penetrated in this way, then it is referred to as “entering the absence of self of dharmas. ” It is not called “absence of a self of dharmas” because the Dharma nature (dharmatā) apart from words that is the object of perception of Buddhas does not exist at all. [Rather,] one speaks of the absence of a self in dharmas because what is grasped by another consciousness [other than that of a Buddha] is of the nature of consciousness only and its substance is also nonexistent. Otherwise, objects of perception grasped by other consciousnesses would [really] exist and the principle of consciousness only would not be demonstrated, because it is admitted that other consciousnesses have real objects of perception. As a consequence of this reasoning, we speak of establishing the teaching of consciousness only, universally causing one to awaken to and enter [the teaching of] the absence of self of all dharmas, and not because the entirety [of dharmas] are rejected as having a nature [of any kind]. [Question:] Again, how do we know that the Buddha, on the basis of a hidden motive, said that there are sense bases of form, etc.? Are there no really existing external dharmas such as form, each of which becomes the special object of perception of consciousness of form, etc.? [Answer:] A verse says:
以彼境非一， 亦非多極微， 又非和合等， 極微不成故。
That object of perception is not one thing, Nor is it many atoms. Also, it is not a compound, etc., Because atoms are not demonstrated [as real].
論曰：此何所說？謂若實有外色等處與色等識各別為境，如是外境或應是一，如勝論者執有分色。或應是多，如執實有眾多極微各別為境，或應多極微和合及和集，如執實有眾多極微皆共和合和集為境。且彼外境理應非一，有分色體異諸分色不可取故。理亦非多，極微各別不可取故。又理非和合或和集為境，一實極微理不成故。云何不成？頌曰：
The Treatise asks, what is being said? It means that if there are really existing sense bases such as external form, and each [sense base] acts separately as an object of perception for consciousness of form, etc., then such an external object of perception is either a single thing, as in the Vaisesika assertion of a [single] form with parts, or else it must be many [atoms], such as the assertion of really existing multiple atoms, each of which serves as a separate object of perception. Or the object of perception must be a compound or combination of atoms, like the assertion of really existing multiple atoms all unit ing and combining to make objects of perception. But that external object of perception must not logically be one thing, because a substance of form possessing parts that is different from the parts cannot be grasped. It also cannot logically be many [atoms], because the atoms cannot be grasped individually. Nor, logically, does a compound or combination act as an object of perception, because the principle of a single ultimate atom (paramāṇu) is not demonstrated [as existing]. Why is it not demonstrated? A verse says:
極微與六合， 一應成六分； 若與六同處， 聚應如極微。
If an atom is united with six [other atoms], The one must consist of six parts. If it is in the same place with the six, Then the combination must be like [a single] atom.
論曰：若一極微六方各與一極微合，應成六分，一處無容有餘處故。一極微處若有六微，應諸聚色如極微量，展轉相望不過量故，則應聚色亦不可見。[1]加濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言：「非諸極微有相合義，無方分故，離如前失；但諸聚色有相合理，有方分故。」此亦不然。頌曰：
The Treatise says, if each of six sides of an atom is united with [another] atom, [the single atom] must be made up of six parts, because it is not possible for the location of one [atom] to be in the locations of the others. If there are six atoms in the location of one atom, then the combined form must resemble the mass of [a single] atom, because, being interchangeable, they do not exceed the mass [of a single atom,] in which case the combined form would be invisible. The Kashmiri Vaibhasika masters say, “We do not mean that atoms unite. [Atoms] have no parts, and therefore we avoid such [logical] faults as the one above. However, the combined forms possess the characteristics of union, because these [combinations] do have parts.” [We reply,] this, too, is not correct. A verse says:
極微既無合， 聚有合者誰？ 或相合不成， 不由無方分。
Since atoms do not unite, To what does the union of [larger] combinations belong? Or else, the uniting [of atoms] is not demonstrated; It is not because they are devoid of parts.
論曰：今應詰彼所說理趣。既異極微無別聚色，極微無合聚合者誰？若轉救言：「聚色展轉，亦無合義。」則不應言：「極微無合，無方分故。」聚有方分，亦不許合。故極微無合，不由無方分。是故一實極微不成。又許極微合與不合，其過[2]且爾。若許極微有分無分，俱為大失。所以者何？頌曰：
The Treatise says, we must now scrutinize this principle and its meaning. Since there is no separate combined form that differs from atoms, then if atoms do not combine, whose combined union is it? If you change [your position] and try to save it by saying that the development of combined form does not imply union, then you should not say that they do not combine because they are devoid of parts, because a combination has parts, yet, you do not admit union. The nonunion of atoms is not a result of their being devoid of parts. Therefore, not a single ultimate atom (paramāṇu) is demonstrated. Also, the faults [in your reasoning] are still the same whether you admit that atoms unite or do not unite. Whether you admit that atoms have parts or do not have parts, both [positions] are big errors. Why? A verse says,
極微有方分， 理不應成一； 無應影障無， 聚不異無二。
If an atom has parts, It logically would not form a unity. Without [parts], there would be no shadow or concealment, And a combination not being different [from atoms,] it is devoid of the two.
論曰：以一極微六方分異多分為體，云何成一？若一極微無異方分，日輪纔舉光照觸時，云何餘邊得有影現？以無餘分光所不及。又執極微無方分者，云何此彼展輪相障？以無餘分他所不行，可說此彼展轉相礙。既不相礙，應諸極微展轉處同，則諸色聚同一極微量，過如前說。云何不許影障屬聚不屬極微？豈異極微許有聚色發影為障？不爾，若爾聚應無二。謂若聚色不異極微，影障應成不屬聚色。安布差別立為極微，或立[3]為聚，俱非一實，何用思擇極微聚為？猶未能遮外色等相，此復何相？謂眼等境亦是青等實色等性。應共審思，此眼等境青等實性為一為多？設爾何失？二俱有過，多過如前。一亦非理。頌曰：
The Treatise says, the six parts [i.e., sides] of an atom being different, many parts make up its body, so how can they form a unity? If an atom does not have different parts, then how is it that when the sun rises and its light illuminates it, the other side is able to reveal shadow? Since there are no other parts unreached by the light and you are asserting atoms without parts, how can this [atom] and that [atom] successively conceal each other [from view]? And since there are no remaining parts unreached by the other, how can you say that this and that [atoms] successively conceal each other? Since they do not conceal each other, the various atoms must be interchangeable in the same place, and then the combined forms must have the same mass as a single atom. The error is the same as previously mentioned. [Question:] Why not admit that shadow and concealment belong to combinations but not to atoms? [We reply,] can it be that you admit that there is combined form that differs from atoms that casts shadows and acts to conceal [another form]? [The questioner says,] not at all. [We reply,] in that case, the combination must be devoid of the two [i.e., shadow and concealment]. That is, if combined form is not different from atoms, then shadow and concealment must be demonstrated as not belonging to combined form. Arranging and distinguishing, you establish [form] as atoms or you establish it as a combination [of form, but] both are unrealities. [Question:] What is the use of choosing atoms or combination as it? You are still unable to refute the characteristics of external form, etc. [We reply,] what, again, are these characteristics? [The objector replies,] objects of perception of eyes, etc., are of the nature of being real colors such as blue, etc. [We reply,] we must ascertain together whether the true nature of blue, etc., of objects of perception of the eyes, etc., are unitary or many. [The opponent says,] suppose [either] is so; what is the problem? [We reply,] both [arguments] are faulty. The fault of there being many is as [explained] previously. The [position] of unitariness is also unreasonable. A verse says:
一應無次行， 俱時至未至， 及多有間事， 并難見細物。
In the case of unity, there would be no piecemeal going; One could arrive and not yet arrive at all times. [Nor] would there be intervals between many [things], [Or] tiny things that are difficult to see.
論曰：若無隔別，所有青等眼所行境執為一物，應無漸次行大地理，若下一足至一切故。又應俱時於此於彼無至未至。一物一時，理不應有得未得故。又一方處，應不得有多象馬等有間隙事，若處有一亦即有餘，云何此彼可辯差別？或二如何可於一處有至不至中間見空？又亦應無小水虫等難見細物，彼與麁物同一處所，量應等故。若謂由相此彼差別即成別物，不由餘義。則定應許此差別物展轉分析成多極微，已辯極微非一實物，是則離識，眼等色等、若根若境皆不得成。由此善成唯有識義。諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝。若無外境寧有此覺：我今現證如是境耶。此證不成。頌曰：
The Treatise says that if there were blue, etc., that was without divisions, objects of perception reached by the eyes, etc., would be grasped as single things. There would be no principle of gradually travelling the earth, because by setting down one foot, you would arrive at all [places]. What is more, at all times, one would be [both] here and there, without arriving [here] or not arriving [there], because a single thing or single time [without divisions] would logically neither be grasped nor not grasped. Also, there could not be disconnected things such as many elephants, horses, etc. in a single location. If one place had one, it would have the others. How would one or another be distinguishable? Or else, if there were two [of something,] how would it be possible for them to reach or not reach [a place] or for one to see an empty space between them? Also, there would be no tiny things that are difficult to see, such as small water insects, because being in the same location as something gross, their mass would be equal [and no small object would appear]. If you say that this or that [object] has differences due to its characteristics and becomes a different thing for no other reason, then you certainly must admit that these [large] distinct things differentiate repeatedly, forming multiple atoms, and since we have argued that an atom is not a single real thing, then eyes, etc., and form, etc., apart from consciousness as organs of perception or as objects of perception, are incapable of being demonstrated. As a result of this, we have easily demonstrated the principle that only consciousness exists. [Question:] Dharmas are determined to exist or not exist through the use of accepted means of knowledge (pramāṇa), and the most excellent of all accepted means of knowledge is direct perception (pratyakṣa). If there are no external objects of perception, how can one have the awareness, “I am now experiencing such an object of perception?” [We reply:] This proof is not demonstrated. A verse says:
現覺如夢等， 已起現覺時， 見及境已無， 寧許有現量？
Direct awareness is as in dreams, etc. At the time direct awareness has occurred, The seeing and the object of perception are already nonexistent. How can you admit the existence of direct perception?
論曰：如夢等時雖無外境，而亦得有如是現覺，餘時現覺應知亦爾，故彼引此為證不成。又若爾時有此現覺，我今現證如是色等；爾時於境能見已無，要在意識能分別故，時眼等識必已謝故。剎那論者有此覺時，色等現境亦皆已滅，如何此時許有現量？要曾現受意識能憶，是故決定有曾受境，見此境者許為現量，由斯外境實有義成。如是要由先受後憶證有外境，理亦不成。何以故？頌曰：
The Treatise says, just as, even though when we dream, etc., there is no external object of perception, still, such direct awareness as this is possible, so, also, direct awareness at other times must be understood to be likewise. Therefore, their citation of this [example] as proof is not demonstrated. Also, if, at that time, there is the direct awareness, “I am now directly experiencing such a form,” etc., one can see at that time, vis-à-vis the object of perception that it is already nonexistent, because it is necessarily in the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) that one can distinguish [visible forms], and because by that time [when awareness dawns in mental consciousness], visual and other kinds of consciousness have necessarily already ceased. Those who theorize about instantaneousness (kṣaṇavādin) say that when this awareness [in mental consciousness] exists, the actual object of perception such as form has already ceased. How can you admit that at this time there is direct perception? [The objector replies,] it is necessary that something that mental consciousness is able to remember has already been directly experienced [in the immediately antecedent mental moment], and for that reason, it is certain that there is an object of perception that has been experienced. He who sees this object of perception admits that it is direct perception. From this, the principle of an external object of perception that really exists is demonstrated. [We reply,] the principle that one perceives that there is an external object because it is necessary that there first be an experience and then a memory is not demonstrated. Why? A verse says:
如說似境識， 從此生憶念。
As we have said, there is consciousness that resembles an external object of perception, And from this is born a memory.
論曰：如前所說，雖無外境，而眼識等似外境現，從此後位與念相應，分別意識似前境現，即說此為憶曾所受，故以後憶證先所見實有外境，其理不成。若如夢中雖無實境而識得起，覺時亦然。如世自知夢境非有，覺時既爾，何不自知？既不自知覺境非有，寧[4]如夢識實境皆無？此亦非證。頌曰：
The Treatise says, as we have said previously, even though there are no external objects of perception, still, visual consciousness (cakṣur-vijñāna), etc., appears resembling an external object of perception. Following this, at a subsequent stage, [the object of perception] is associated with memory, and discriminating mental consciousness appears resembling the prior object of perception. Then we speak of this [process] as remembering what has already been experienced. Therefore, using a subsequent memory to prove the real existence of an external object of perception that was previously seen is not demonstrated. [Counter-argument:] If it is just as in an awakened state as in a dream that even without real objects of perception, consciousness is still able to occur, then, just as ordinary people know that dream objects of perception are nonexistent, why, when they are awake, and it is so [that external objects are not real], do they not naturally know [they are unreal]? Since they do not naturally know that waking objects are nonexistent, how, as in dream consciousness, are real objects of perception all nonexistent? [Answer:] Neither is this demonstrated. A verse says:
未覺不能知， 夢所見非有。
When not awake, one cannot know That what is seen in a dream does not exist.
論曰：如未覺位，不知夢境非外實有，覺時乃知。如是世間虛妄分別串習[5]惛熟如在夢中，諸有所見皆非實有，未得真覺不能自知。若時得彼出世對治無分別智，乃名真覺。此後所得世間淨智現在前位，如實了知彼境非實，其義平等。若諸有情，由自相續轉變差別似境識起，不由外境為所緣生，彼諸有情近善惡友、聞正邪法二識決定。既無友教，此云何成？非不得成。頌曰：
The Treatise says, just as one in a not-yet-awakened state does not know that objects of perception in a dream do not really exist externally, but once awakened one knows it, in the same way, [conscious] worldly false discrimination is repeatedly confused as in a dream. None of the entities one sees really exists, and one who has not acquired true awakening cannot know this. If one acquires that supramundane antidote [to delusion] that is nondiscriminative knowledge (nirvikalpaka-jñāna) called “true awakening,” then the mundane pure knowledge acquired subsequent to this (tat-prsthalabha-suddha-laukika-jnâna) appears before one and one knows thoroughly according to reality that that object of perception is not real. The principle is the same [in both dreams and the waking state]. [Objection:] If in sentient beings there arises consciousness that resembles [external] objects of perception because of a special transformation of their own mental continuity (saṃtāna) and not because of external objects of perception born from conditions, how can it be demonstrated that these sentient beings are approached by good or bad companions, hear the correct or wrong teaching, and have [one of] two [kinds of] consciousness determined, since there are [in reality] no companions or teachings [outside of consciousness]? [We reply,] we are not incapable of demonstrating it. A verse says:
展轉增上力， 二識成決定。
By means of the interchange of dominant power, Two [individual] consciousnesses achieve restriction (niyama).
論曰：以諸有情自他相續諸識展轉為增上緣，隨其所應二識決定，謂餘相續識差別故，[7]令餘相續差別識生，各成決定不由外境。若如夢中境雖無實而識得起，覺識亦然，何緣夢覺造善惡行，愛非愛果當受不同？頌曰：
The Treatise says, by means of the dominant condition (adhipatipratyaya), which is the interchange between various [individual] consciousnesses, which are the mental continuities of sentient beings, two [kinds of] consciousness are restricted as is fitting [to each individual]. That is, because the difference in consciousness in the mental continuity of one causes differences in the mental continuity of another consciousness to occur, each becomes restricted [according to kind], but not as a result of external objects of perception. [Question:] If, just as in a dream, objects of perception are devoid of reality but consciousness can occur, and the same is true of waking consciousness, what is the reason for good or bad action taking place in a dream or in a waking state not receiving the same results of action (karma-phala), either desirable or undesirable? [We reply,] a verse says:
心由睡眠壞， 夢覺果不同。
The mind is weakened by sleep, So the results [of acts] in sleep and wakefulness are not the same.
論曰：在夢位心，由睡眠壞，勢力羸劣。覺心不爾，故所造行當受異熟，勝劣不同非由外境。若唯有識無身語等，羊等云何為他所殺？若羊等死不由他害，屠者云何得殺生罪？頌曰：
The Treatise says, in dreams the mind is weakened by sleep and its power is slight. This is not true of the awake mind. Therefore acts performed ought to receive different retribution (vipāka), and so weak and strong are not the same. [The reason] is not because of external objects of perception. [Question:] If there is only consciousness and no body, speech, etc., how are sheep, etc., killed? If the deaths of sheep are not the result of someone’s injury, how can the one who is a butcher commit the crime of killing beings? [We reply,] a verse says,
由他識轉變， 有殺害事業， 如鬼等意力， 令他失念等。
As a result of the transformation of another’s consciousness, There are acts of injury and killing, Just as the mental power of anger of sage-immortals (āraṇyaka), Causes others to lose their memory, etc.
論曰：如由鬼等意念勢力，令他有情失念得夢，或著魅等變異事成。具神通者意念勢力，令他夢中見種種事，如大迦多衍那意願勢力，令娑[A1]剌拏王等夢見異事。又如阿練若仙人意憤勢力，令吠摩質[1]呾利王夢見異事。如是由他識轉變故，令他違害命根事起。應知死者謂眾同分，由識變異相續斷滅。復次頌曰：
The Treatise says, just as the mental power of a demon, etc., causes other sentient beings to lose their memory, have dreams, or bring about such strange events as possession by evil spirits; or the mental power of someone who possesses supernatural powers causes another person to see many things in a dream, just as Mahākātyāyana’s power of wish caused King Śaraṇa, etc., to see strange things in a dream; and also just as the mental powers of anger of sage-immortals caused King Vemacitra to see strange things in a dream; in the same way, the transformation of consciousness of one individual brings about events that cause injury to the life force of another person far away. You should realize that “death” refers to the severing of the personal mental continuity through changes of consciousness. Again, a verse says:
彈咤迦等空， 云何由仙忿？ 意罰為大罪， 此復云何成？
The emptiness of the Daṇḍaka [Forest], etc.— How could it result from the anger of sage-immortals? Mental harm is a great offense; How, again, can this be demonstrated?
論曰：若不許由他識轉變增上力故他有情死，云何世尊為成意罰是大罪故，返問長者鄔波離言：「汝頗曾聞何因緣故，彈[＊]咤迦林、末蹬伽林、羯[3]陵伽林皆空閑寂？」長者白佛言：「喬答摩！我聞由仙意憤恚故。」若執神鬼敬重仙人，知嫌為殺彼有情類，不但由仙意憤恚者，云何引彼成立意罰為大罪性過於身語？由此應知，但由仙忿彼有情死，理善成立。若唯有識，諸他心智知他心不？設爾何失？若不能知，何謂他心智？若能知者，唯識應不成。雖知他心，然不如實。頌曰：
The Treatise says, if you do not admit that other sentient beings die as a result of the dominant power of transformation of the consciousness of another, how is it that the World-Honored One, in order to prove that mental harm is a great offense, asked Upali the householder, “Have you ever heard why the Daṇḍaka Forest, Mātaṅga Forest, and Kaliṅga Forest were all made empty and solitary?” The householder answered the Buddha, saying, “Gotama, I have heard that it was because of the mental anger of sage-immortals (āraṇyaka).” If you assert that spirits or demons, respecting the sage-immortals and knowing their hatred [for the king], acted to kill the species of sentient beings, and it was not a result of mental anger [on the part of the sage-immortals], then why [did the Buddha] introduce that [story] to establish mental harm as having the nature of a major offense and surpassing physical and verbal [offenses]? Consequently, you must realize that it is well demonstrated that the death of sentient beings [in the story] resulted only from the anger of the sage-immortals. [Question:] If only consciousness exists, does knowledge of the minds of others [really] know the minds of others or not? [We reply,] if we agree, what is the error? [The opponent argues,] if you are unable to know, how can you speak of knowledge of others’ minds? If you are able to know [the minds of others,] then consciousness only is not demonstrated [because you admit the real existence of others]. [We reply,] even though one knows the minds of others, still, it is not [knowing] according to reality (yathā-artha). A verse says,
他心智云何， 知境不如實？ 如知自心智， 不知如佛境。
How does knowledge of others’ minds Not know the object of perception according to reality? In the same way that knowledge in knowing one’s own mind Does not know it in accordance with the object of perception of a Buddha.
論曰：諸他心智云何於境不如實知？如自心智。此自心智云何於境不如實知？由無知故。二智於境各由無知所覆蔽故，不知如佛淨智所行不可言境。此二於境不如實知，由似外境虛妄顯現故、所取能取分別未斷故。唯識理趣無邊決擇，品類差別難度甚深，非佛誰能具廣決擇。頌曰：
The Treatise says, how can knowledge of the minds of others not know objects of perception in accordance with reality? It is like knowledge of one’s own mind. [Question:] Why does knowledge of one’s own mind not know the object of perception according to reality? Because of ignorance of the object of perception. Because each of the two [kinds of knowledge] is concealed by ignorance, they do not know the ineffable object of perception in accordance with a Buddha’s pure knowledge. These two do not know the object of perception in accordance with reality because of false appearances that resemble external objects of perception, and because the discrimination of the grasped and the grasper is not eliminated. The principles and [numbers of] meanings of [the teaching of] consciousness only are boundless in the differences of ascertainments and kinds, and their depths are difficult to cross over. If one is not a Buddha, who can ascertain their total extent? A verse says:
我已隨自能， 略成唯識義， 此中一切種， 難思佛所行。
According to my ability, I Have briefly demonstrated the principles of consciousness only. Of these, the entirety (sarvathā) Is difficult to consider and is reached [only] by Buddhas.
論曰：唯識理趣品類無邊，我隨自能已略成立。餘一切種非所思議，超諸尋思所行[4]境故。如是理趣唯佛所行，諸佛世尊於一切境[5]及一切種智無礙故。
The Treatise says, the kinds of principles and meanings of [the teaching of] consciousness only are limitless. I have briefly demonstrated them according to my own ability. The rest of the entirety have not been considered [by me] because they transcend the realm reached by my investigation. Such principles and meanings are only reached [in their entirety] by Buddhas, because Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, are unobstructed with regard to objects of perception and knowledge of the entirety.